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Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful
Pregnancy, and Wrongful Birth in the
United States and England
ANTHONY JACKSON*
I. WRONGFUL LIFE
A. What is a "Wrongful Life"?
Baby Shauna might reasonably have assumed that she would
be born in good health. Her parents, Phillis and Hyam, did
everything within their power to ensure a healthy birth. In fact,
out of concern for Shauna's well-being, Phillis and Hyam went so
far as to undergo tests to ensure that their baby daughter was not
at risk of being born with a debilitating disease.
Naturally, Phillis and Hyam relied on the results of these tests
in deciding to parent a healthy child. Had they known that they
were the carriers of genes that could lead to a crippling disease,
Phillis and Hyam would not have continued with the pregnancy.
The laboratory assured them that all was well, however, and as far
as Phillis and Hyam knew, Shauna could eagerly anticipate her
entrance into life without unnecessary complications.
Phillis and Hyam understandably assumed that the lab would
perform the tests with the requisite skill and care. In fact,
however, the lab was grossly negligent in conducting the tests.
Moreover, at the time these tests were performed, the nation's
leading authors on Tay Sachs expressly warned the lab that its test
procedures were substantially inaccurate and could produce a false
negative result, in conscious disregard of the health, safety, and
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well-being of the baby.1 Phillis and Hyam could not have known
that the information they had sought for Shauna's sake was
incorrect.
As a result of the laboratory's negligence, Shauna was born
mentally-retarded. Her many symptoms included: high susceptibil-
ity to disease; convulsions; partial blindness; inability to feed orally;
loss of motor reactions, including the inability to sit up or to hold
up her head; and gross physical deformity. Shauna's life expectan-
cy was no more than four years, during which she would suffer
great physical pain, emotional distress, and a loss of enjoyment of
life.
Shauna was born with precisely the crippling disease that her
parents had sought to avoid. The question this incident poses is
whether the resulting child should be able to bring legal action
against the doctor or applicable authority, without whose negli-
gence that child never would have suffered from such horrific
disorders. The doctor's negligence resulted in the birth of a child
with insuperable disabilities.
Such an action reflects the rapid progress in genetic medical
knowledge during the latter part of this century. Increasingly,
doctors can predict the probability that children will be handi-
capped by genetic disorders. Timely advice thus enables parents
to decide whether or not to conceive; in more advanced circum-
stances, it also can allow parents to decide whether to continue
with a pregnancy. Such actions can arise from the failure to test
satisfactorily for genetic conditions or to screen for genetic
problems, or the failure to offer sufficient or appropriate advice on
hereditary disorders. In addition, during the pregnancy itself, the
doctor can fail to offer amniocentesis to a pregnant rubella contact
or a mother whose child is susceptible to Down's syndrome.
Moreover, if offered, such procedures also carry the risk that they
will be negligently performed or that their results will not be
communicated.
This action raises unusual legal issues. The claim is brought
by or on behalf of the child who alleges that she was born because
of the doctor's negligent failure to properly advise her parents and,
as a result, has to suffer the condition. The doctor's negligent
1. Curlender v. Bia-Science Lab., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811 (1980).
536 [Vol. 17:535
Wrongful Life, Pregnancy & Birth
advice causes the pain, suffering, and financial hardship experi-
enced each day by the child.
The doctor has not caused the disability itself. But for the
doctor's negligent acts, however, the child would not have been
born and, thus, would not have suffered the ensuing condition.
The parents either would have decided not to conceive or, if they
became aware of the condition at a later stage, would have
terminated the pregnancy in accordance with the applicable law.
This action has been labeled as one brought by the child for her
own "wrongful life." The emotive bias of this phrase will be
discussed below.
Actions for "wrongful life" raise interesting questions of both
law and ethics, examining the interrelationship of medicine, social
policy, and tortious conduct. The issue demands attention in
societies that recognize both medical advances and their impact on
the law.
A relatively recent phenomena, wrongful life cases have arisen
in both the United States and England. Despite cultural and legal
differences between the two countries, the outcomes in these cases,
with a few noteworthy exceptions, have been the same. This
similarity makes a comparative study highly informative. The
wrongful life action has transcended different cultural starting
points and has produced similar answers in both societies.
This Article examines judicial responses to the complex legal
and ethical problems raised by such actions. It closely analyzes the
rationales on which courts rely in making their decisions. These
rationales reveal that the legal systems in both countries desperate-
ly need to return to the fundamental components of each claim in
order to reformulate solutions that better address the needs for
consistency and justice.
B. Judicial Response
In the only wrongful life case decided in England,2 the doctor
negligently failed to detect German measles. As a result, the child
was born partially blind and deaf, with serious damage to her
neural tissues, as well as other disabilities not considered by the
court.3 During the pregnancy, the child's mother suspected that
2. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166.
3. Id.
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she had contracted German measles.4 She therefore went to see
her doctor, explaining that she was pregnant and concerned about
her child's future well-being.5 The doctor assured her that she did
not have rubella.6 Furthermore, as the child had not been
infected, the doctor assured the mother that she did not have to
consider an abortion or worry about the child's health.7 Relying
on this information, the child's mother continued her pregnancy.
In fact, the doctor had negligently misplaced one of the two blood
samples that he had taken from the mother.9 In addition, he
confused one of her samples with a sample taken from another
source." As a result, the doctor negligently failed to interpret
her test. The complaint alleged that but for the doctor's negli-
gence, the mother would have terminated her pregnancy to avoid
giving birth to a child with debilitating injuries."
The court of appeals rejected the claim, stating that this was
"a wholly novel claim, supported by no English authority.' 12
Furthermore, the court could not make sense of the reasoning
employed by the only U.S. case supporting such an action. 3
The English court held that the doctor owed no legal duty to
the fetus "to prevent its birth" nor to "cause its death."' 4 More-
over, the court found the mother's rubella, and not any conduct on
the part of the doctor, to be the sole cause of injury to the
child.' 5
Even if the child had suffered a legally cognizable injury, the
court declared that compensatory damages would be impossible to
calculate. According to the court, the purpose of monetary
damages is to "as far as possible put the injured party in the
condition in which he or she was before being injured."' 6 The
court cited to the "impossibility of making such an assessment" in
4. Id. at 1172.
5. 1d.
6. Id.
7. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1173.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1172.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1173.
12. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1186.
13. Id
14. Id- at 1188.
15. Id. at 1178.
16. Id. at 1181.
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a case for wrongful life, as it apparently would involve comparing
a life with defects against non-existence, which the court could not
evaluate.17 In addition, the court found that such an action was
against public policy, running "wholly contrary to the concept of
the sanctity of human life."' 8
The procedural bases for this decision are questionable.' 9
Substantial arguments in favor of a novel cause of action should
not be regarded as unarguable. In fact, substantial arguments in
favor of this novel cause of action were made in the U.S. case that
the English court rejected without analysis.2" Furthermore, these
same arguments were made in subsequent cases in that jurisdiction.
This differential treatment makes crucial the need to examine the
ways in which U.S. courts have dealt with the same issue.
A majority of states in the United States have rejected the
"wrongful life" cause of action. Notwithstanding two earlier cases
in which the U.S. courts considered actions by children against
their parents for having been born illegitimate,2' Gleitman v.
Cosgrove22 represents the first major U.S. decision on the current
topic. In that case, the doctor knew that the patient had rubella
but negligently advised her that the disease would not affect her
child in any way.23 The complaint alleged that, had she been
properly informed, the patient would have terminated her
pregnancy to avoid giving birth to a child suffering crippling
disabilities.
24
The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied the child's claim for
wrongful life. The court found particularly troubling the child's
assertion that he would have been better off not being born.
According to Chief Judge Weintraub, "[m]an, who knows nothing
of death or nothingness, cannot possibly know whether that is
so. )925 Furthermore, using reasoning parallel to the reasoning
used in a later case, the court found that "there is no precedent in
appellate judicial pronouncements that holds a child has a
17. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1189.
18. Id. at 1188.
19. Id. at 413.
20. Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811 (1980).
21. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1963), Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343
(N.Y. 1966).
22. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
23. Id. at 690.
24. Id. at 691.
25. Id. at 711 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part).
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fundamental right to be born as a whole, functional human
being.,2 6 The court also found that damages were nearly "impos-
sible" to calculate in a wrongful life cause of action.27 Such a
calculation would involve measuring "the difference between his
life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence."
28
Throughout the decision, the court evinced a general reluc-
tance to sanction abortion by allowing a cause of action to be
predicated upon the deprivation of "the opportunity to terminate
the existence of a defective child in embryo., 29 Subsequent cases
cite similar reasoning in denyng actions for a variety of afflictions,
including Down's syndrome and polycystic kidney disease.3
Nevertheless, three states, including New Jersey, currently
recognize the right of a child to bring a wrongful life claim. 2 The
first of these decisions is Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab.,33 a 1980
California case involving the facts cited in the introduction of this
Article.
In that case, the court agreed with one of the dissenting
comments in Gleitman, specifically that the denial of the child's
action "permits a wrong with serious consequential injury to go
wholly unaddressed."34 Judge Patterson systematically dismantled
the reasons previously offered to reject wrongful life claims. First,
citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,35 Judge
Patterson stated that the parents' constitutional right to have an
abortion, proved "to be of considerable importance in defining the
parameters of 'wrongful life' litigation."3 6 He thus rejected the
now inapplicable argument that the illegality of an abortion was a
reason to deny wrongful life claims. Second, Judge Patterson
reiterated the principle, clearly stated by the U.S. Supreme Court
26. Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (Pa. 1979).
27. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 693.
30. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y.
1978).
31. Park v. Chessin, 60 A.2d 80 (N.Y. 1977), rev'd and overruled by Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
32. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984). The other two jurisdictions are
California and Washington. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
33. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811 (1980).
34. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (N.J. 1967).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 820. This decision was handed down six years after
the New Jersey Supreme Court Gleitman decision.
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fifty years prior, that difficulties in computing damages could not
be permitted to justify a denial of liability for negligence.37 After
reviewing the more recent decisions of courts in other jurisdictions,
Judge Patterson found that, "there has been a gradual retreat from
accepting 'impossibility of measuring damages' as the sole ground
for barring the infant's right of recovery."3 8 Third, following a
federal district court decision in a Tay-Sachs case two years
earlier,39 Judge Patterson recognized that "society has an interest
in insuring that genetic testing is properly performed and interpret-
ed."'  He thus found a legally cognizable injury in that case
because the child suffered from the Tay-Sachs disease as a result
of the defendants' negligence.41
The Curlender court found that the serious nature of the
wrong, combined with the fact that such diseases go undetected
because of a lack of due medical attention, suffices to allow such
actions in law.42 The Curlender court further held that damages
should be calculated to compensate "for the pain and suffering to
be endured during the limited life span available to such a child
and any special pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired
condition.
4 3
In the subsequent case of Turpin v. Sortini,4 the California
Supreme Court agreed to allow actions for wrongful life but
disputed the Curlender court's method of calculating damages.
The Turpin case involved James and Donna Thrpin's two chil-
dren-for these purposes, rather inappropriately named 'Hope'
and 'Joy.'45 In 1976, on the advice of their pediatrician, the
Turpins took their only daughter, Hope, to be evaluated for a
possible hearing disorder. Hope was examined by a licensed
professional specializing in the diagnosis and treatment of speech
and hearing defects.' He advised the Turpins that her hearing
37. Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
38. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 826.
39. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.Pa.
1978).
40. d at 696.
41. Id
42. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 830.
43. Id
44. 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
45. Id at 955-56.
46. Id at 956.
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was within normal limits.4 7 Three months later, relying upon this
diagnosis, James and Donna decided to conceive their second
child, Joy.' Had they known that Hope suffered from hereditary
deafness, which could also afflict any future children the Turpins
might have, they would never have conceived Joy.49
In fact, the specialist had negligently examined, tested, and
evaluated Hope.5 0 Far from having hearing within normal limits,
Hope was actually 'stone deaf' due to a hereditary ailment.5
James and Donna did not learn of this until late 1977, two months
after the birth of Joy, when other specialists diagnosed Hope's true
condition. The nature of this condition was such that there was
a reasonable degree of medical probability that the hearing defect
would be inherited by any future children conceived by the
Turpins.5 3 Joy was born in August 1977, suffering from the same
total deafness as her sister Hope.54
The court rejected the proposition that an impaired life was
preferable to nonlife in all circumstances. While affirming the
"worth and sanctity of less-than-perfect life," the court neverthe-
less questioned whether these considerations alone provide a
sound basis for rejecting the child's tort action. 5 The court
doubted whether, in the case of deafness, a jury would find that
life with the condition was worse than no life at all.56 Neverthe-
less, the court ruled that if a disease were very serious, "we cannot
assert with confidence that in every situation there would be a
societal consensus that life is preferable to never having been born
at all.",
5 7
The Turpin court denied recovery for general damages, citing
the impossibility of determining whether the plaintiff had, in fact,
suffered any injury by being born. 8 Furthermore, the court held
that, even if damages could be determined, a fair, non-speculative
47. Id.
48. lid at 956.
49. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. 1982).
50. Id. at 956.
51. Id
52. Id. at 956.
53. Id
54. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. 1982).
55. Id. at 961.
56. Id. at 962-63.
57. Id. at 963.
58. Id.
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assessment of any resulting damages also would be impossible to
determine. Unlike the Curlender court, however, the Turpin
court indicated that it would allow the child to recover damages
for her medical expensesA° First, such damages, according to the
court, are "both certain and readily measurable., 61  Second,
recognizing that the parents did not have their own action in law
based on exactly the same facts, the court allowed recovery of
medical expenses on the ground that it would be "illogical and
anomalous to permit only parents, and not the child, to recover for
the cost of the child's own medical care., 62  Lastly, the court
allowed the child to recover medical expenses because, otherwise,
such recovery would depend entirely upon "the wholly fortuitous
circumstance" of whether the parents were available to sue or
whether the expenses were incurred at a time when the parents no
longer remained legally responsible for providing care to the
child.63
The Turpin dissent criticized the decision as being "internally
inconsistent" in permiting "a child to recover special damages for
a so-called wrongful life action, but den[ying] all general damages
for the very same tort. '  While commending the "modest
compassion" of the majority, the dissent further noted that "they
suggest no principle of law that justifies so neatly circumscribing
the nature of damages suffered as a result of a defendant's
negligence."65
All U.S. jurisdictions, as well as England, recognize the right
of a child to sue a member of the medical profession for any
disability that the doctor negligently inflicted on the child before
birth. Nevertheless, in denying a child's right to sue for wrongful
life, courts have argued that to allow such a course of action would
require the extension of traditional tort concepts beyond manage-
able bounds.
This Article argues that wrongful life claims do fit squarely
within the tort law system and that, consequently, the above
assertion cannot withstand close analysis. In a traditional tort
59. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 963 (Cal. 1982).
60. Id at 965.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id
64. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
65. Id
19951 543
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
action, the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and, thus,
must compensate the plaintiff with monetary damages. Therefore,
a child's action for wrongful life against a negligent physician must
be examined in the context of this paradigm. In addition to
satisfying each of the requirements for a traditional tort action, the
child's claim for wrongful life results in substantial injustice where
it is denied.
C. The Conception of Wrongful Life Within the Law of Torts
1. The Duty
When deciding the tort action of negligence, courts must ask
whether defendant owed plaintiff a "duty of care." The duty of
care is a useful tool for mapping out those areas of human
behavior upon which the courts should impose liability. Neverthe-
less, the concept of duty has certain analytical limitations. As
Prosser and Keeton note, duty cannot be unearthed through close
examination precisely because "it is a shorthand statement of a
conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself" 66 Perhaps
attempting to explain these limitations, Winfield and Jolowicz
acknowledge that "duty is the primary control device which allows
the courts to keep liability for negligence within acceptable limits,
and the controversies which have centered around the criteria for
the existence of a duty reflect differences of opinion as to the
proper ambit of the law of negligence.
67
The law in both the United States and in England similarly
approach the question of when, and under what circumstances, a
duty should be imposed. In the traditional analysis, a court first
attempts to delineate general circumstances under which a duty
will be imposed. Then, the court conducts a fact-specific examina-
tion to determine whether the plaintiff in a particular case was a
foreseeable victim of the breach of the duty. Lord Goff, in Smith
v. Littlewoods Org. Ltd.,' accurately summarized the modem
legal trend in both countries: "[T]he broad general principle of
liability for foreseeable damage is so widely applicable that the
function of the duty of care is not so much to identify cases where
66. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 358 (1984).
67. W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 73 (1989).
68. [1987] 1 App. Cas. 241, 280.
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liability is imposed as to identify those where it is not."'69 Never-
theless, an examination of the various approaches courts use for
guidance in this field is informative.
The history of contemporary English case law began with the
two-stage test formulated by Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton
London Borough.7 °  In that case, the court first required a
relationship of sufficient "proximity or neighbourhood" between
plaintiff and defendant such that, in the latter's reasonable
contemplation, carelessness on her part might cause damage to the
former. Where such a relationship existed, the court imposed
a prima facie duty of care.72 Then, the court considered whether
any factors existed that ought to negate, reduce, or limit that
duty.
7
This case caused such a backlash that, within a decade, it no
longer represented a correct general statement of the approach to
establish a duty of care. Most of the blame for this must be placed
on the enthusiastic judges who took up the elegant rationalization
of the law, as spelled out in Anns v. Merton, and used it to attack
previously well-entrenched principles of non-liability.
Ten years later, the Privy Council in Yuen Kun Yeu v.
Attorney-General of Hong Kong reversed Anns by finding two
available interpretations of the first stage of the test articulated in
that case.74 First, the Council considered whether proximity
entailed merely the reasonable foreseeability of the injury itself,
thus relegating all matters of "policy" to the second stage of the
test.7 1 The Council rejected this interpretation. Rather, the
Council interpreted "proximity" to include a number of factors,
including foreseeability, which should be considered in the
imposition of a duty of care.76 Under the Council's interpreta-
tion, the whole concept of the necessary relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant, especially its closeness and directness,
69. Id.
70. 1978 App. Cas. 728.
71. Id at 751.
72. Id. at 751-52.
73. Id at 752.
74. [1988] 1 App. Cas. 175 (P.C. 1987) (appeal taken from H.K.).
75. Id.
76. Id at 191-92.
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must be examined.77 Courts have followed this approach in
subsequent cases.
78
Commentators note, however, that "the differences between
the approach in these cases on the one hand and the Anns formula
on the other is verbal, a matter of emphasis., 79 In more recent
cases, the concept of "proximity" seems to differ according to the
type of case. Where the loss arises from an act that inflicts
physical harm upon the plaintiff or her property, the defendant's
duty may be established by foreseeability alone." Where the loss
arises from a failure to act, or a statement, or where the loss is
purely economical, the court may insist upon a substantially closer
relationship between the parties.8"
Under the current approach, "'policy', whether concealed in
the language of proximity, or free-standing in the comparatively
rare cases to which the Anns second stage is now said to be
applicable, means simply that the court must decide ... whether
there should be a duty."'  In either case, duty is ultimately a
policy issue, and courts must decide whether they best represent
the interests of society by imposing liability in a particular case.
U.S. cases also treat the concept of duty as subject to policy
considerations. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. involved an action
against a rock radio station with a large teenage audience. 3 To
increase its popularity, the station ran a contest in which listeners
raced to locate an ever-moving disc-jockey at his next stopping
point and answer a fairly simple question.' The first listeners to
do so received money and a brief appearance on air. 5 In the
facts that gave rise to this action, two minors, driving separate cars,
attempted to pursue the disc-jockey to his next destination. 6 In
the course of their pursuit, one of the minors negligently forced
another car off the road and into the center divider, killing its sole
77. Id at 192.
78. See, e.g., Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, 1989 App. Cas. 191; Ryeford
Homes Ltd. v. Sevenoaks D.C., NEW L.J., 255 (1989); Mills v. Winchester Diocesan Bd.,
2 All E.R. 317 (1989).
79. ROGERS, supra note 67, at 79.
80. Id at 79.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 80.
83. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1985).
84. Id. at 43-44.
85. Id at 44.
86. Id
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occupant!' The surviving wife and children of the decedent sued
the radio station. The court recognized a duty of care based on
the foreseeable risk of harm to other road users caused by the
activities of the defendants. 88 As a result, the plaintiffs could
recover.
The Weirum court utilized an expansive definition of duty.
Rather than adopting a rigid legal formula, the court stated that
"any number of considerations may justify the imposition of duty
in particular circumstances, including the guidance of history, our
continually refined concepts of morals and justice, the convenience
of the rule, and social judgment as to where the loss should
fall." 89 Thus, courts are willing to use the concept of duty as a
door by which to introduce policy considerations into the law of
torts.
Kelly v. Gwinnell further illustrates this point. There, the
court held that a social host could be liable for any injury to the
victim of an automobile accident caused by the negligent driving
of one of the host's guests.9' Where a host serves alcohol to a
guest who is visibly drunk, that host may be liable for the negligent
acts of that guest toward a third party arising out of the guest's
intoxicated state.92
In reaching its conclusion, the court recognized that establish-
ing a duty "involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties,
the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed
solution." 93 Ultimately, "when the court determines that a duty
exists and liability will be extended, it draws judicial lines based on
fairness and policy."'  Thus, once again, the question of the
existence of a duty is one of policy, not strict legal principle.
Establishing the duty does not signify the end of the matter,
however. Once a court finds that a duty exists, it then must ask
whether the duty is owed to the individual plaintiff before the
court. Both U.S. and English courts have devised "tests" for
determining the proper placement of ultimate liability.
87. Id. at 45.
88. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 46 (Cal. 1985).
89. Id at 46.
90. 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
91. Id. at 1222.
92. Id. at 1224.
93. Id. at 1222.
94. Id.
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Donoghue v. Stevenson95-arguably the most famous English
decision-enunciated both the circumstances in which a duty
would arise and to whom it would be owed. The case arose after
two young women decided to have a relaxing afternoon at a cafe
in Paisley.96 One of the women offered to treat the other to a
bottle of ginger-beer. 9  The shopkeeper, who received his
supplies from the manufacturer, opened the bottle for the young
woman and poured some of its contents into a tumbler that
already contained a portion of ice-cream.9' After the woman
drank a portion of the contents of the tumbler, her friend began
to pour the remainder of the bottle's contents into the tumbler. At
this time, the two women discovered the decomposing remains of
a snail floating out of the bottle.9
As a result of both the nauseating sight of the snail and the
impurities in the ginger-beer, which she had already consumed, the
young woman suffered from both shock and severe gastro-
enteritis." She could not have examined the contents of the
ginger-beer beforehand, as it was sold in opaque bottles sealed
with metal caps. The young woman's complaint alleged that,
because the drink was manufactured for public consumption, "it
was the duty of the [manufacturer] to provide a system of working
his business which would not allow snails to get into his ginger-
beer bottles."' 1°
In holding that the manufacturer owed the general public a
duty to ensure that his bottles were free of noxious matter, and
that he would be liable in tort should such a duty be broken, Lord
Atkin laid out the principles upon which a duty would be both
established and breached. The now famous passage states in full:
In English law there must be, and is, some general conception
of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular
cases found in the books are instances. The liability for negli-
gence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems
as a species of 'culpa', is no doubt based upon a general public
sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must
95. 1932 App. Cas. 562.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id
99. Id. at 601.
100. Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562, 601.
101. Id. at 563.
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pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code would censure
cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to
every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way
rules of law arise which limit the range of complainants and the
extent of their remedy. The rule that you are to love your
neighbor becomes, in law, you must not injure your neighbor;
and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbor? receives a
restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts
or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely
to injure your neighbor. Who, then, in law is my neighbor?
The answer seems to be-persons who are so closely and
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them
in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my
mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.'O°
At the second level of inquiry as to whether a breach of duty
occurred in a particular case, the court must determine whether
the injury to the plaintiff would have been in the contemplation of
the "reasonable man." Lord Atkin's reference to "neighbours"
contemplates foresight, and not merely physical closeness. Under
this definition, "neighbours" includes "persons who are so closely
and directly affected by [one's] act that [the actor] ought reason-
ably to have them in contemplation." This analysis raises the
related issue of exactly who these "persons" are.
In the United States, the equally famous case of Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R.1 °3 addressed this question. Although they may
be suspect, the facts as presented to the New York Court of
Appeals involved a man attempting to board a moving train.
Servants of the defendant railroad company allegedly acted
negligently in causing the man to drop a small package that he was
carrying, which was wrapped in newspaper.1  While a guard on
one of the cars held the door open and tried to help the gentleman
aboard, another guard on the platform gave him a push from
behind. 5 The package, which evidently contained fireworks,
dropped onto the rails and caused an explosion, which knocked
102. id. at 580.
103. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
104. 1& at 99.
105. Id.
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over some scales many feet away.'06 These scales struck and
injured the plaintiff, Helen Palsgraf. °
In finding for the defendants, the court stated that, regardless
of whether the defendants' servants were negligent with respect to
the person or property of the man carrying the package, they were
not negligent with respect to Helen Palsgraf."° The court found
determinative the fact that nothing in the appearance of the
package suggested to even the most cautious mind that it would
cause a violent explosion.' °9  Citing this fact, Chief Justice
Cardozo reasoned that:
[i]f no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an
act innocent and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with
reference to her, did not take to itself the quality of a tort
because it happened to be a wrong.. . [T]he orbit of the danger
as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the
orbit of the duty.110
The English case of Bourhill v. Young states the same
principle."' In Bourhill, Lord Russell stated that the duty of
care "only arises towards those individuals of whom it may
reasonably be anticipated that they will be affected by the act
which constitutes the alleged breach."' 1 2 Because the duty of
care depends upon the time-worn considerations of "reasonable-
ness" and "foreseeability," policy concerns thus govern who may
recover in individual cases. The court in Kelly v. Gwinnell
explicitly recognized this fact when it stated that "[w]e impose this
duty on the host to the third party because we believe that the
policy considerations served by its imposition far outweigh those
asserted in opposition.'
113
Clearly, then, "duty" is not sacrosanct. Rather, it represents
"an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protec-
tion.""' 4  As long as the concept of duty establishes a general
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 99-100.
111. 1943 App. Cas. 92.
112. Id. at 102.
113. 478 A.2d 1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984).
114. Brennen v. Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 722 (Or. 1979).
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context of liability as well as a specific context that applies to a
particular plaintiff in an individual case, duty remains a device
through which judges introduce policy considerations into the law.
Indeed, "the only necessary function performed by the duty of
care concept in the present law is to deal with those cases where
liability is denied not because of lack of foreseeability but for
reasons of policy." '115
Actions for wrongful life must be considered in light of this
tendency to justify the imposition of a duty with policy consider-
ations. Whatever the courts' reasons for accepting or rejecting
actions for wrongful life in the cases discussed above, those
decisions to refuse recognition of the doctor's duty toward the
child were based on policy alone. Such policy decisions should be
reversed, and a duty owed to the child should be found. Clearly,
the act giving rise to the claim is a negligent one, typically
involving a medical practitioner who lost a blood sample, misread
a laboratory report, or offered ill advice about a condition that
should have been detected. The relationship between the doctor
and the child in these cases is a close one. Furthermore, the injury
to the plaintiff is foreseeable, since the mother most likely
employed the doctor to help her make an informed choice about
whether or not to give birth to a child. The result of the doctor's
negligence, the birth of a child suffering from a disability that
should have been detected, is precisely that which the defendants
were supposed to have guarded against.
Applying Lord Atkin's "neighbor principle," the unborn child
clearly should fall within the contemplation of the doctor. A
reasonable doctor necessarily would know that the unborn child
naturally will be affected by any advice given to the mother.
Therefore, the court's assumption that wrongful life actions
cannot exist because the doctor owes no duty to the child must be
analyzed critically. Sound reasons in both law and policy support
allowing the action. These reasons, grounded in both law and
morality, as well as the nature such a duty should take, deserve
closer examination.
As a glance at the U.S. cases quickly confirms, the fact that
the child is as yet unborn will not present a barrier to all legal
claims. The physician may indeed owe a duty to the child in the
115. ROGERS, supra note 67, at 83.
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child's own right. As with the English case of Burton, Bonbrest v.
Kotz116 was the first U.S. decision to recognize a right of action
for the breach of a duty owed to a fetus. Thereafter, for the
purposes of recovery under the law of torts, courts considered the
unborn child a "person" from the moment of conception.
In two later cases that demonstrate the extent of this duty, the
courts found a duty owed to the unborn child under circumstances
far more tenuous than they would be in the context of a wrongful
life action. In Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Lab., Inc.," 7 the
court held that mongoloid children have a cognizable complaint
against the manufacturer of their mothers' birth control pills, once
plaintiffs establish that the pills were responsible for the mongoloid
condition. Furthermore, in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,"8 a
physician negligently transfused a female patient with an incom-
patible blood type.19 Nine years later, the woman gave birth to
a child suffering from permanent damage to various organs,
including the brain and the nervous system. 20 The court held
that the physician reasonably could have foreseen both that his
teenage patient would later marry and have children and that a
subsequent child could be injured as a result of his negligent blood
transfusion. Thus, in effect, a physician engaging in an activity
unrelated to a present or future pregnancy may nevertheless owe
a duty of care to future children of the patient, despite the fact
that those children were not in anyone's immediate contemplation
at the time of the treatment. Clearly, then, a specialist in
childbirth or prenatal conditions should owe a duty of care to the
existing child on whose behalf he provided the treatment.
Furthermore, denial of a child's wrongful life action is
seemingly inconsistent with established precedent finding that the
medical profession owes the mother a duty of care in cases arising
out of exactly the same facts.' Recognizing this inconsistency,
the court in McKay122 acknowledged that a duty did indeed exist,
although they failed to follow this legal principle on policy
116. 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946).
117. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
118. 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1967).
119. She was given Rhesus positive blood that was incompatible with Rhesus negative,
her actual blood group. ld at 1251.
120. Id.
121. These so-called "wrongful birth" cases are discussed below.
122. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166 (Eng. C.A.).
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grounds. There, Lord Justice Ackner found as a matter "of
course" that the doctor owed a duty to the mother under such
circumstances, accepting that policy did not bar her claims.'23
Thus, the negligent doctor's failure to perform an abortion or a
sterilization, or the negligent failure to inform the parents of a
fetal abnormality, may be considered grounds for finding the beach
of a duty. The courts' reluctance to apply the same duty to
wrongful life cases, which are based on identical facts, seems
peculiar. These cases fail to offer a logical answer to the pertinent
observation that "if a duty is owed to one of the affected parties,
why not to the other?,
124
Even if one accepts that a duty is owed to the child, however,
the nature of that duty also must be considered, especially with
respect to judicial pronouncements characterizing it in a rather
nebulous light. The court of appeal in McKay held that duty
required the medical profession actively to "take away life."'
2 5
In Lord Justice Stephenson's characterization, "[t]he only duty
which either defendant can owe to the unborn child... is a duty
to abort or kill her., 126  Of course, no justifications exist for a
duty to take away life. For good reasons, however, the wrongful
life claim does not seek to punish the physician for failing to kill
the child. If the law imposed a duty upon doctors to prevent the
birth of a child, one of two unpalatable alternatives would result
should the mother decide to continue the pregnancy. The idea
that a doctor would be under a legal duty to abort the child, even
if against the express wishes of the child's mother, seems horrific
by any civilized standards. Of course, no ethical grounds exist to
legally bind a doctor to kill a baby who is both expected and
desired.
Equally distasteful is the second alternative result. In a case
where a mother desires to give birth to the child, her failure to
prevent its birth constitutes an intervening act, which both absolves
the doctor from liability and may subject her to liability with
respect to the child's future wrongful birth action.127 If the duty
123. Id. at 1188.
124. Tony Weir, Wrongful Life - Nipped in the Bud, 1982 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 225, 227.
125. McKay, [1982] 1 Q.B. at 1179.
126. Id. at 1178.
127. Lord Justice Ackner recognized that ... if the duty of care to the fetus involved
a duty on the doctor... to prevent its birth, the child would have a cause of action against
its mother who had unreasonably refused to have an abortion." Id. at 1188.
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owed requires the prevention of birth under such wrongful life
circumstances, then such a mother clearly breaches that duty.
Furthermore, this duty places the mother in the seemingly
paradoxical position of being potentially liable to a plaintiff whose
very existence is the result of the alleged wrongful decision. Such
a result would be absurd. It naturally would disrupt that child's
family life, also causing bitterness and raising acute social implica-
tions. Clearly, such a basis for the duty should be rejected
automatically on policy grounds alone.
Thus, the duty owed by the doctor in wrongful life cases is not
to prevent the birth of the child. Rather, the duty only requires
the doctor to inform the mother of any risks associated with the
birth of her child. Indeed, Lord Justice Griffiths' dissent in McKay
recognized this distinction.128 Emphasizing that the ultimate
decision whether or not to abort must always belong to the
mother, Lord Justice Griffiths stated that "if there is a risk that the
child will be born deformed, that risk must be explained to the
mother, but it surely cannot be asserted that the doctor owes a
duty to the fetus to urge its destruction." '129
The responsibility to inform is the essence of the duty in
wrongful life cases. Recognizing this duty contradicts the asser-
tion, made in several wrongful life cases, that allowing such actions
would encourage doctors to practice "defensive medicine" by
experiencing subconscious pressure to advise abortions in doubtful
cases out of fear of actions for damages.13 The doctor's duty to
provide information to the mother about any risks to the fetus
naturally ends once the information is provided. A wrongful life
action could not succeed against the doctor because she was not
under any obligation to prevent the birth of the child. This result
is supported by the policy reasons discussed above.
Imposing a duty on doctors to inform parents of the probabili-
ty that their offspring will not be born in the condition that they
expect is a reversion to the traditional principle of "informed
consent." In Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals set forth the elements a plaintiff must establish
to show that her consent was not properly "informed." '131 The
128. Id. at 1189.
129. Id. at 1192.
130. For example, see McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth. [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1187.
131. 746 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1984).
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plaintiff must show that she was unaware of a material risk and
that the doctor failed to disclose that risk. 32 She further must
show that had she known of the risk, she would have pursued a
different course of action, and that the failure to disclose the risk
led to the injury.1 33  Each of these factors is necessary to a
successful action for wrongful life.
Clearly, a doctor's negligent failure to disclose leads to an
unknown risk to the parents. Furthermore, the parents' decision
to conceive is a direct result of their ignorance about the child's
condition. Ultimately, the child is born, suffering from the
undisclosed disabilities.
If a duty is placed on the doctor to offer competent medical
information and advice,134 a court must then determine to which
person or persons the doctor owes such a duty. While it is
generally accepted that such a duty is owed to the mother,
traditionally it has been denied to the child. A leading English
treatise, however, maintains that "there is no reason why the duty
cannot be owed to the child through the agency of its mother and
hence an action brought by the child for breach of a duty owed to
it. '1 35 Recognizing that the mother is acting in the interests of
her child, it seems sensible to designate her as its agent.
As previously established, a legal duty can extend to an
unborn person. Accordingly, Turpin v. Sortini36 recognized that
during the gestation period, "the law generally accords the parents
the right to act to protect the child's interests., 137  The child is
not precluded from bringing an action in his own right simply
because he can act only through his parents.
This viewpoint is particularly persuasive when applied by
analogy to the following situation: a landlord fails to inform a
pregnant woman of a dangerously loose step on his premises; if the
132. I& at 522.
133. It.
134. This duty was imposed in wrongful life cases that have recognized the action. For
example, the Curlender court held: "We have no difficulty in ascertaining and finding the
existence of a duty owed by medical laboratories engaged in genetic testing to parents and
their as yet unborn children to use ordinary care in administration of available tests for the
purpose of providing information concerning potential genetic defects in the unborn."
Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 828 (1980).
135. IAN KENNEDY & ANDREw GRUBB, MEDICAL LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 26
(1989).
136. 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
137. Id. at 962.
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woman trips on that loose step, and the fetus is injured as a result,
the fetus would have an action in law against the landlord.
138
The fact that the landlord owes an independent duty to the mother
is irrelevant to the child's action, which he can bring in his own
right. The fact that the mother could have prevented the injury to
the fetus had the landlord informed her of the loose step will not
preclude the fetus from bringing his own action where the
information was not disclosed. The court does not deny the fetus
recovery merely because he would not have been able to act on his
own right.
In wrongful life cases, the law should also recognize the
existence of a duty to a fetus where a doctor fails to disclose
material information to its mother. In each case, the decision to
act on the advice rests with the mother, but "in a 'wrongful life'
context, the fetus' inability to decide between life and nonexistence
should not be the basis for relieving the physician of his duty to
inform the fetus, through the parents, of possible birth de-
fects., 139 The doctor's duty to inform logically extends to an
unborn child.
Recognizing that a doctor owes a child a duty to inform her
mother of the child's condition, but owes no duty to physically
prevent her birth, does not resolve the problem of a child who
sues her mother for failing to act on the doctor's advice. Once the
doctor informs the mother of the risks involved, his legal duty is
fulfilled. If the mother decides to continue her pregnancy, the
issue then becomes whether the child can sue her mother.
The Curlender14 court addressed this issue but provided an
unsatisfactory answer. The court held that when a parent, with full
knowledge of the child's future disability, decides to continue the
pregnancy, the decision constitutes "an intervening act of proxi-
mate cause.""14 The court further argued that "no sound public
policy should protect those parents from being answerable for the
pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought upon their
offspring.
142
138. Note, A Cause of Action for 'Wrongful life': [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L.
REv. 58, 70 (1970).
139. Thomas Keasler Foutz, "Wrongful life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL. L.
REv. 480, 490 (1980).
140. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811 (1980).
141. Id. at 829.
142. Id.
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The Curlender court's reasoning has encountered several
criticisms. First, it is clear that the parents did not cause the
injuries themselves. Second, though the parents' decision to
continue with a pregnancy is the proximate cause of the birth, tort
liability does not attach if the decision was not negligent. More-
over, cases in which a parent knows that a child will be born
disabled, but nevertheless decides to bring her into the world are
the most inappropriate cases to impose liability. Society should
not punish parents who have chosen to care for their disabled
child. It is likely that parents who consciously bring a disabled
child into the world will be particularly nurturing and sensitive to
the child's needs and will demonstrate genuine love and care.
Rather than imposing legal sanctions upon them, these are parents
whom society should respect.
If a child were allowed to sue his parents under these
circumstances, the policy implications would be offensive. While
policy considerations alone should be enough to override this
action, there are several key differences between a duty to prevent
birth and a mere duty to inform. These distinctions will make it
easier to recognize that an action between mother and child in
such a case would be impossible.
First, a mother makes a choice on behalf of the child. The
doctor's duty is limited to providing the mother with sufficient
information to allow her to make an informed choice. Once she
has made a choice, it is the choice of the child as well. She is
acting as the spokesperson for the child who is incapable of
expressing his desire. Therefore, a child should not be allowed to
bring an action based upon a wrong decision because it is
"impossible to envisage an action against the mother if the
outcome of that informed choice is a live child. The mother's
choice is the child's choice, for who else would we have exercise
it? 143
A relatively straightforward principle of tort law supporting
the denial of a child's action against the mother is often over-
looked by courts and commentators. To fully understand why an
action by a child against his mother would be impossible, the cause
of action must be broken down into stages. The doctor is liable
143. Robert Lee, To Be or Not to Be: Is that the Question? The Claim of Wrongful
Life, in BIRTHRIGHTS: LAW AND ETHICS AT THE BEGINNING OF LIFE 172, 182 (Robert
Lee & Derek Morgan eds., 1989).
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because of her negligent advice, and this negligent advice gives rise
to the claim. When a mother, after being informed of the risks,
decides to conceive or continue with her pregnancy, her potential
liability is entirely different. Notwithstanding the reasons why a
mother decides to give birth to a disabled child, it is extremely
improbable that her decision is negligent.1" No child would be
able to prove that the mother's decision was made negligently.
Establishing that negligent advice given by a doctor denied the
mother the opportunity to make a conscious decision, on behalf of
the child, whether or not to continue with the pregnancy is a
factual issue. A cause of action cannot succeed unless the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the defendant acted negligently. Proving
negligence by a doctor can be accomplished, but proving the
mother's negligence is almost impossible.
In England, a child is statutorily precluded from bringing an
action against his mother by the Congenital Disabilities (Civil
Liability) Act of 1976.145 A mother cannot be liable to her
offspring under the Act. In the United States, the doctrine of
parental immunity is eroding, and the courts are beginning to
address the circumstances under which a child can sue her parents.
The legal reasoning in these cases, where a mother allegedly has
caused prenatal damage to her child, is instructive. In wrongful
life cases, however, the mother has done nothing to cause any
injury to the child. This obvious distinction supports the present
argument.
In Grodin v. Grodin,146 Randy Grodin, Roberta's infant son,
brought an action against his mother for his brown teeth. He
alleged that his brown teeth were the result of his mother's use of
medication during her pregnancy.147 Roberta was prescribed the
drug Tetracycline for a medical condition entirely unrelated to her
pregnancy. 148 At the time, she did not know the she was preg-
nant because she had been previously informed that she was
144. Id.
145. Section 1(1) reads: "If a child is born disabled as the result of such an occurrence
before its birth as is mentioned in subsection (2) below, and a person (other than the
child's own mother) is under this section answerable to the child in respect of the
occurrence, the child's disabilities are to be regarded as damage resulting from the
wrongful act of that person and actionable accordingly at the suit of the child." Congenital
Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act of 1976, ch. 28, § 1(1) (Eng.).
146. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. 1980).
147. Id. at 870.
148. Id. at 869.
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unable to bear children. 4 9 The Tetracycline prescription and the
assurance of her inability to conceive occurred on two separate
and completely independent visits to her doctor.
Randy brought his action, claiming that his mother was
negligent in her failure to seek proper prenatal care after becom-
ing pregnant, in her failure to request a pregnancy test, and in
failing to inform her doctor that she had continued to take the
drug Tetracycline.150 The court held that circumstances existed
to impose liability on the mother. According to the Grodin court,
"[T]he focal question is whether the decision reached by a woman
in a particular case was a 'reasonable exercise of parental
discretion."""' The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the case for a determination of the "reasonableness" of
the alleged negligent conduct.152
Strong law and policy considerations make it abhorrent for
any court to hold that the failure to procure an abortion was an
unreasonable exercise of parental authority. To legalize the killing
of the fetus is one thing; to state that it is unreasonable not to
choose such a course of action is quite another. A woman's choice
to give birth to a child, which she clearly desires to nurture, should
always be reasonable.
In Stallman v. Youngquist,5 3 an action by a child against its
mother who had negligently injured the fetus while driving, was
dismissed based on the policy grounds discussed above. The court
held that a child has no cause of action against its mother for a
prenatal injury unintentionally inflicted upon it.'54 Such liability
was said to involve excessive legal interference in the uniquely
intimate relationship that exists between a mother and her fetus,
at the expense of the mother's rights of privacy and autonomy.155
The court was not prepared to create two potential legal adversar-
ies under these circumstances from the moment of conception until
birth. The court held that a mother's liability is different from that
of a third person because the relationship between a mother and
149. Id.
150. Id. at 870.
151. Id. at 871.
152. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W. 2d 869, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
153. 531 N.E.2d 355 (I11. 988).
154. Id. at 361.
155. Id. at 360.
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her fetus is unlike that between any other plaintiff and defen-
dant.156 No other plaintiff depends exclusively upon any other
defendant for everything necessary to begin and sustain life itself.
Likewise, no other defendant must endure profound and possibly
life-threatening biological changes to bring the adversary into the
world.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that these and other policy
factors influenced the California Legislature to reverse part of the
Curlender decision, which enabled a child suffering from a
disability to sue her parents after giving birth to her despite their
knowledge of her condition.57 Currently, a child cannot, as a
matter of state law, bring an action for wrongful life against her
parents.'58
In cases where a child is allowed to bring an action against a
parent, two factors must exist: (1) negligence, and (2) an unreason-
able exercise of parental authority. In wrongful life cases,
however, neither requirement is present. Accordingly, a doctor
owes a child a duty to inform the child's mother about any
possible abnormalities in his condition. Once the doctor conveys
this information, she has fulfilled her legal duty. If the doctor
provides negligent information, she is liable to the child. Once the
doctor informs a mother of any risks in a manner expected of
someone in her profession, she can no longer be held legally liable.
Under these circumstances, if the mother continues with the
pregnancy, she should not be liable to her child in a wrongful life
suit for legal and policy reasons.
2. The Cause
As stated in Curlender, "the real crux of the problem is
whether the breach of duty was the proximate cause of an injury
cognizable at law." '159 Cases denying wrongful life claims have
frequently determined that a doctor cannot be held liable because
he did not cause the injuries to the child. These decisions misun-
derstand the nature of the claim. The child is not saying that "but
156. Id.
157. The Curlender decision was reversed in part by chapter 331 of the 1981 California
Statutes.
158. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6(a)(West 1982 & 1995 Supp.) states, "No cause of action
arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have been
conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born."
159. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 828 (1980).
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for" the negligence he would have been born without defects.
Rather, the child is alleging that had he not been born as a result
of the doctor's negligent advice, he would have not suffered his
present condition.
Interestingly, these cases are similar in principle to those
where a doctor negligently fails to diagnose a terminal disease. As
in wrongful life cases, the doctor did not cause the disease, but the
negligent diagnosis resulted in increased pain and suffering. In
these cases, "survival actions" can be brought on behalf of the
decedent.
It is noteworthy that the causation question in wrongful life
cases is much stronger. In survival actions, the doctor did not, in
any way, cause the disease suffered. The negligence of the doctor
merely precluded a temporary alleviation of the pain. In wrongful
life cases, however, the negligence of the doctor gives rise to the
birth of the child and ultimately causes the disability that is
suffered. Without this negligence, the child would not have been
born, and would not endure any pain and suffering. Analyzing
survival action decisions is illuminating.
In Williams v. Bay Hospital, Inc.'6° a patient was negligently
advised that her chest x-ray was clear and that she had not
developed lung cancer. She subsequently died from cancer.
161
Her widower brought a survival action against the hospital for its
negligent failure to diagnose the cancer.'62 He was forced to
concede that the hospital's negligence did not cause his wife's
death."  The hospital, however, was unable to refute the charge
that it had exacerbated the pain and suffering by its failure to
diagnose the disease." Undisputed medical evidence established
that the negligent diagnosis did not ultimately cause the death of
the patient.' 65 Nevertheless, the court held that a survival action
could be brought for the patient's pain and suffering, which "more
likely than not" the hospital's negligence caused.1
6 6
160. 471 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1985).
161. Id. at 628.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. 1985).
166. Id. at 630.
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Tappan v. Florida Medical Center, Inc.167 involved the
negligent failure of a chiropractor to diagnose lung cancer. A
widow brought a claim on behalf of her deceased husband, alleging
that he would have lived six to eight months longer had he
received a proper diagnosis of, and treatment for, the lung
cancer.168 She conceded that the disease would have ultimately
killed her husband regardless of the negligent manner of treat-
ment.169 In awarding damages, the court held that negligence
was a proximate cause of his shortened life and increased suffering.
No logical distinction exists between the survival actions
discussed above and cases for wrongful life. The physician's
negligence did not cause the disease in either case, nor would
competent medical treatment have been able to avert the illness.
Rather, the negligent act caused the suffering in wrongful life
cases, and increased the suffering in survival actions.
To prove causation, the child must simply demonstrate that:
(1) the physician had a duty to inform the parents of a potential
deformity; (2) the physician, in fact, failed to adequately inform
the child's parents; and (3) had the parents been informed, they
would have prevented the child's birth. Whether the standard to
be applied is of a "reasonable" parent in like circumstances, or
whether a subjective standard should be adopted, is unclear. The
test, however, must necessarily be a subjective one. The child can
only bring the action on the basis of what his mother would have
chosen under the circumstances, not on the basis of what a
"reasonable parent" would have done. Furthermore, the distinc-
tion between an objective and subjective test is largely academic.
A remedy should only be awarded in cases involving very serious
handicaps. Courts probably would agree with the mother's
subjective decision, even when analyzing the circumstances under
an objective test. The court likely would find that a "reasonable
parent" might not have desired to give birth to a child in such
severe circumstances.
"If one accepts the idea that the damage the child is suing for
is not its deformity, but rather its birth, then proximate cause
presents little obstacle to the child's recovery.'17° The child's
167. 488 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1986).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 631.
170. Foutz, supra note 139, at 491.
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birth would have been prevented by the doctor's competent advice,
on which the parents would have relied in choosing not to proceed
with the pregnancy. Had it not been for the negligent advice, the
child would not have been born. Accordingly, in Phillips v. United
States, 7' the court held that where adequately informed parents
would terminate the pregnancy, the failure to provide such
information sufficiently establishes a proximate cause.
3. The Injury
In both England and the United States, courts have found that
it is more convenient to deny wrongful life claims based on a lack
of damage, rather than a lack of duty. In McKay, the court
considered the injuries the doctor caused the child and concluded
that there had been "none in the accepted sense.
' 172
Similarly, in Walker v. Mart,171 the Arizona court dismissed
the action on the basis that bringing a child into the world was not
a legally cognizable injury. This approach generally is supported
on the ground that the doctors did not cause the deformities them-
selves. Furthermore, the assertion that it is preferable not to have
been born rather than being born with severe disabilities is
"logically impossible."' 74 Such conclusions are "a mystery more
properl% left to the philosophers and theologians" than to the
courts.' 5
In a wrongful life claim, it is undisputed that the doctor did
not cause the actual injuries. To argue that the lack of actual
injury precludes an action is to equate a physical injury with legal
harm. The child is not contending that the doctor caused the
deformities per se, rather, he is contending that the negligence
caused the disabilities to be suffered. This suffering certainly
constitutes harm to the child. Moreover, the child does not claim
that the doctor caused the defects. The physician's negligent
failure to inform her parents of certain risks led to the child's
birth. The action arises from the birth itself, not from the resulting
deformities. No logical reason exists to deny a tort action arising
out of childbirth. It is more useful to recognize that the 'no
171. 508 F. Supp. 537 (D. S.C. 1980).
172. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1189.
173. 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990).
174. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1966).
175. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).
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damage' argument is policy-based and asserts the desirability of
life after death.
This view is frequently articulated in case decisions and the
opinions of commentators. McKay established that "the child
would not have been better if the defendants had done their duty;
she would not have been at all. To damage is to make worse, not
to make simpliciter. '' 7 6 This last comment, instead of providing
an answer regarding whether any injury existed, merely reiterated
the question. Simply stated, the child is claiming that she would
have been "better" if she would not have been at all. To declare
that it is never better for a child not to be born is a reasonable
sentiment. It must be recognized, however, that these contentions
are personal value judgments and not objective facts. This specific
point is arguable in individual cases.
The extent to which subjective value judgments have been
treated as objective fact is well illustrated by the Gleitman case.
The court held that it was "basic to the human to seek life and
hold onto it however heavily burdened., 177  Furthermore, the
court found that if the infant plaintiff "could have been asked as
to whether his life should be snuffed out before his full term of
gestation could run its course, our felt intuition of human nature
tells us that he would almost surely choose life with defects as
against no life at all., 178 The emotive language, particularly the
description of life being "snuffed out," resembles a personal
opinion and does not reflect the decision of a court of justice. In
fact, the entire passage is a strong value judgment. It is unclear
why a court should be able to attribute to a fetus those decisions
the court thinks the fetus would have chosen had it been able. It
is particularly peculiar that the source of this statement is a court
that refuses to resolve questions concerning nonexistence.
The fact that a fetus cannot physically express its desire is a
unique feature of this action. The Gleitman court did not provide
an explanation for choosing its own speculative opinion about what
the fetus would have wanted rather than accepting the contentions
of the fetus' mother. Whatever one's opinion regarding whether
non-existence is ever preferable to life, it is uncontroverted that
the maternal bond to the child is likely to be stronger than any
176. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166.
177. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1966).
178. Id.
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judicial bond. To describe life, "however heavily burdened," as a
value completely overlooks the fact that, in each of these cases,
non-existence was the preferred result. This state was not achieved
because of the negligence of the defendant.
It is a fallacy to believe that the defendant's negligence didn't
cause damage to one born with genetic defects that would not exist
if one had not been born. Such faulty reasoning overlooks the fact
that the child lives and suffers as a result of the defendant's
negligence. Further, it ignores the reality that damage does not
always mean to make things worse, it also means to fail to make
things better when one is able to do so.
4. The Damages
Those who argue against a tort for wrongful life usually wage
a double-pronged assault. Even if made to concede that the
plaintiff actually endured an injury when born, critics argue that it
is impossible to calculate damages in a fair, nonspeculative
manner. Gleitman provides a useful illustration of this point.
Classifying the normal nature of tortious damages as "compensato-
ry," the court calculated damages by "comparing the condition
plaintiff would have been in, had the defendants not been
negligent, with plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of the
negligence." '179 The court reasoned that this involved measuring
the difference between "life with defects against the utter void of
non-existence," an impossible task when used to make "the
comparison required by compensatory remedies."18 In England,
the law is identical. The court in McKay held that "the most
compelling reason for rejecting this claim is the intolerable and
insoluble problem it would create in the assessment of damag-
es.,
181
These arguments, however, are incapable of withstanding
closer scrutiny. An interesting paradox immediately emerges upon
examination of the reasons that the courts offer for denying
damage awards in wrongful life cases. In the seminal cases,
McKay"" and Gleitman,' courts in England and the United
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1192.
182. Id.
183. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (NJ 1966).
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States focused their reasoning on the superiority of life over non-
existence in all circumstances. Furthermore, in Berman v.
Allan,1 84 the court held that "life-whether experienced with or
without a major physical handicap-is more precious than non-
life." '185 Notably, this is the precise reason upon which courts
rely in refusing to recognize that the child had suffered any legally
cognizable injury.
The courts further contend that they are incapable of
measuring damages because it is absolutely impossible to compare
the relative values of life and non-existence. In so doing, however,
they seemingly overlook their own premise-life is superior to
non-existence under any circumstances. They fail to recognize
that, ironically, "the very premise logically entails the measurability
in principle of non-existence, simply by virtue of the assertion that
it is necessarily worth less than life in any form.
1 6
If non-existence "cannot be measured, how is one to know
whether life is always more valuable?"" 8  In Speck v.
Finegold,8 8 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania analyzed this
question with honesty. The Court rejected the argument that it
was impossible to calculate the respective values of existence and
non-existence as a "hyper-scholastic rationale" serving only to
mask judicial reluctance to hear wrongful life cases.189 As with
other areas of "reasoning" in denying these claims, it is apparent
that policy is stronger than logic. In certain situations, the law
implicitly allows a comparison between life and non-existence. For
example, the law declares that doctors act lawfully in refusing to
provide life-prolonging treatment to disabled children, citing the
child's "best interests."'" Therefore, comparing life with non-life
is something that the law, in principle, is already prepared to do.
Superintendent of Belchertown State School V Saikewicz191
provides a U.S. example of this principle. In that case, a severely
retarded adult was afflicted with leukemia, for which chemothera-
184. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
185. Id. at 12.
186. Harvey Teff, The Action for 'Wrongful Life' in England and the United States, 34
INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 423, 433 (1985).
187. Alexander M. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
618, 650 (1979).
188. 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
189. Id. at 115.
190. In re B (a minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1422.
191. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
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py could produce only temporary remission."9  The treatment
would produce adverse side-effects and result in suffering that Mr.
Saikewicz could not understand. 3 Because of this, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, it was not in
Mr. Saikewicz's interest to prolong his life.1 94 This decision
appears impossible to reconcile with the many other decisions that
prevail in the courts that the life, in law, is always preferable to
non-life. Under these circumstances, the law recognizes the
relative values of life and non-existence.
Examining the manner in which the law of torts treats the
issue of damages can be helpful. Fundamental reasons exist for
allowing a child to bring the action, and he should not be preclud-
ed by imprecise calculations of damages. In fact, when the Law
Commission of England and Wales considered whether actions
should be permissible in cases of wrongful life,' 95 and in conclud-
ing that they should not, they recognized that "law is an artifact
and, if social justice requires that there should be a remedy given
for a wrong then logic should not stand in the way. 196  The
same principle has long been recognized in the United States. In
1931, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson
Parchment Paper Co.,"9  explicitly declared that difficulties
encountered in the computation of damages cannot be permitted
to justify a denial of liability.'98 Cases that have denied wrongful
life actions have also accepted this principle. 99
It is difficult to understand why the "immeasureability" of
damages in these cases is used by courts to deny an action and
completely ignored in many other cases. This point is exemplified
by the contradictory statements of Lord Justice Stephenson in
192. Id. at 420.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 435.
195. Law Com. No. 60, Report on Injuries to Unborn Children (Cmnd 5709) (1974).
196. Id. para. 89.
197. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
198. See also McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166.
199. See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (NJ. 1979)(holding that "... . were the measure
of damages our sole concern, it is possible that some judicial remedy could be fashioned
which would redress plaintiff, if only in part, for injuries suffered."); see also Speck v.
Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981)(referring to the" ... recognized principle, not peculiar
to traditional tort law alone, that it would be a denial of justice to deny all relief where a
wrong is of such a nature as to preclude certain ascertained damages.").
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McKay.2° Asserting that if there were sound legal grounds to
recognize this tort, he "would not let the strict application of logic
... defeat it," 1° his Lordship overlooked the fact that he had
previously declared that "if difficulty in assessing damages is a bad
reason for refusing the task, impossibility of assessing them is a
good one.""z If one agrees with the former statement, the latter
serves only to emphasize the judiciary's manipulation of neutral
components of the tort system to deny claims on policy grounds
that it perceives to be unmeritorious.
One needs only to examine other areas of tort case law, where
damages are awarded, to realize that the difficulty in assessing
damages should not preclude a remedy. Courts readily calculate
damages in cases involving a shortened life expectancy. These
cases demonstrate that a slide-rule cannot be of significant
assistance in attempting to transform misfortune into precise
203monetary compensation.
Ironically, Lord Justice Stephenson stated in McKay2°4 that
the prospect of calculating damages in a case involving loss of
expectation of life "has been held so difficult that the courts have
been driven to fix for it the constant and arbitrary figure."' 5 He
does not provide an explanation regarding why damages cannot be
calculated in a wrongful life case. Instead, Stephenson meekly
expresses the now implausible assertion that assessing such
damages is impossible.
In more common tort claims, it is often impossible to place a
monetary figure on an injury. The majority of cases award
punitive damages for personal injuries. It is, however, just as
arbitrary to place a precise figure on the loss of a limb or a serious
permanent medical injury as it is to determine figures in cases for
200. [19821 1 Q.B. 1166.
201. Id. at 1184.
202. Id. at 1182.
203. See Weir, supra note 124, at 228. Referring to the decision of the court of appeal
in McKay, he recognized that ".... their Lordships tended to say that it [the damage] was
insusceptible of measurement. This is not quite accurate. For forty years the courts have
been awarding damages for 'loss of expectation of life,' i.e., for being killed ... since it is
the fact that they have done it, they can hardly deny that it is possible. If one can give
damages for the onset of permanent unconsciousness (death) one can equally give
damages for the onset of temporary consciousness (life): the factors in the equation are
identical." Id.
204. McKay, 1 Q.B. at 1166.
205. Id. at 1181.
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wrongful life. Furthermore, in wrongful birth cases, courts are
prepared to calculate damages upon a showing of facts identical to
those comprising actions for wrongful life. While the judiciary
does not believe these cases involve the same excursion into
metaphysics as a comparison between life and non-existence, it
remains unclear why it is significantly more certain to assess the
value of a child's aid, comfort, and society, so as to offset against
the cost of upbringing the unwanted child. Any such calculations
are necessarily speculative in nature. Damages should not, and
have not, been denied on this ground alone.
A major reason why the damages issue creates confusion is
the defendants' reliance on the tort principle that damages are
compensatory in nature and are designed to "put the injured party
in the condition in which he or she was before being injured.""
Critics of the wrongful life action state that it is impossible to put
the plaintiff back into his or her former condition. Arguably, "a
restitutio in integrum by specific physical compensation" is
inconceivable, and "[a] life which should not have been created
may not be snuffed out."2" This emotive declaration, again,
misunderstands both the action and the nature of the damages.
A plaintiff is not claiming that he wishes to be literally
transplanted back into the exact pre-injury state, nor will tort
damages generally accomplish this task. The difficulty with this
type of mischaracterization is that it ignores reality. All damages
in tort law are estimates. It is no easier to return the plaintiff's
negligently crushed left arm than it is to return him to oblivion.
Tort damages are only "compensatory" to the extent that they
award monetary remedies to someone who has suffered a wrong.
The rationale supporting these awards is easier to understand and
to accept if one recognizes the form that damages actually take.
An award of damages is a vindication of the plaintiff's rights rather
than a forced physical regression into his prior condition.2°
An examination of less tangible, non-physical injuries
exemplifies this point. In the law of defamation, "presumed
damages" can be awarded in certain circumstances without any
206. Id.
207. G. Tedeshi, On Tort Liability for 'Wrongful Life', 1 ISR. L. REv. 513, 536 (1966).
208. See Teff, supra note 186, at 435. "In the last analysis [tortious damages] are more
intelligible as a general vindication of rights, or as reasonable solace for the plaintiff's
condition, then as purported restoration of the status quo." Idt
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showing of actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation at all. If it
were strictly necessary to place a plaintiff in his pre-tort condition,
little basis exists for awarding damages in cases where there is
neither an attempt to figure out what the original condition was,
nor an attempt to ascertain the extent it has been altered by the
alleged injury. If it is possible under present law to calculate the
difference between an injury and no injury, there is no reason to
deny a remedy to a child who was injured in the manner discussed
above. Awarding damages for wrongful life is neither more
speculative nor less certain than other tort actions that are
permitted access to the courts on a daily basis.
To some extent, the method that is used to calculate the
damages awarded in wrongful life cases should not form a part of
the discussion about whether such actions should be recognized.
Having seen that once courts find that a claim has merit, they will
readily devise a way to award a remedy, it suffices to say that for
all the reasons articulated in this Article such an action should lie.
It is informative, at the very least, to examine how courts that
recognize the action have awarded damages in attempting to
outline the most plausible direction that should be followed by the
judiciary on this issue.
Curlender was the landmark case to consider the form that
damages should take.2" There, the court allowed the child to
recover damages for the pain she would suffer during her limited
lifetime, and for any extra expenses she would incur as a result of
her impaired condition.21° Subsequent decisions, however, have
restricted the Curlender scope, primarily by rejecting so-called
"general damages" for pain and suffering in this type of case. In
Turpin v. Sortini,211 for example, the court restricted the damages
recoverable to "special" damages "for the extraordinary expenses
necessary to treat the hereditary ailment. 21 2 While this damage
restriction has been followed in all subsequent cases allowing
wrongful life actions,211 the bases for these decisions remain
209. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811 (1980).
210. Id. at 489.
211. 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
212. Id. at 966.
213. See, e.g., Nandini Gami, a minor v. Mullikin Medical Ctr., 135 Cal. App. 3d 189
(1993); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984). In Andalon v. Superior Court, 162
Cal. App. 3d 600 (1984), the parties recognized that the Turpin calculation was too
challenging thereby stipulating that the plaintiff could not recover general damages for the
570 [Vol. 17:535
Wrongful Life, Pregnancy & Birth
unclear. The dissent in Turpin first argued this point, questioning
why a court that was prepared to sanction a remedy in these case
but did not put into monetary terms the very wrong that gave rise
to the action.214
This line of criticism was embraced by later commentators
who recognized that "it seems odd to admit simultaneously that an
injury has been inflicted on the child while denying full compensa-
tion for it." '215 Furthermore, "the court should not choose which
damage they want to allow and then deny those which logically
flow from their reasoning., 216  It is inconsistent to reach a de-
sired result but ignore the reasoning necessary to achieve that
result.
"The general rule of damages in tort is that the injured party
may recover for all detriment caused. 21 7. Nonetheless, courts
waver between awarding damages for pain and suffering and
awarding damages for extraordinary expenses only. It is equally
important to consider injuries where damages should not be
awarded and to offer solutions about how damages can be
calculated.
The child should not be compensated for the injury itself. As
previously noted, these actions are unusual because the doctor did
not cause the actual defect. To award damages for the injury
would be akin to holding the physician liable for a consequence
that her negligence did not cause. Commentators misguidedly
suggest that a doctor should be required to pay for a child's
everyday expenses in these cases. The factor that is claimed to be
"wrongful" in wrongful life cases is the fact that the child was born
with defects, which he was negligently assured he would not
pain and suffering that arose out of the genetic defect. Id. Furthermore, there could be
no recovery for the loss of the plaintiff's earning capacity, as the child would have been
born with the defects even without the negligence. Id. Therefore, the doctor could not
be held responsible for removing earning capacity. Id.
214. The dissent stated, "An order is internally inconsistent which permits a child to
recover special damages for a so-called wrongful life action, but denies all general damages
for the very same tort. While the modest compassion of the majority may be commend-
able, they suggest no principle of law that justifies so neatly circumscribing the nature of
damages suffered as a result of a defendant's negligence." Turpin, 643 P.2d at 966 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
215. Roger B. Dworkin, The New Genetics, 1 BIO. L. 89, 98 (1986).
216. Kathleen Gallagher, Wrongful Life: Should the Action be Allowed?, 47 L.A. L.
REv. 1319, 1328 (1987).
217. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (1967).
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possess, not that he has to incur everyday expenses. If the child
was born in a healthy condition, the condition that was negligently
advised, he would have necessarily incurred everyday expenses in
the same way as any other individual.
The claim in a wrongful life case is the balance between the
benefits that the child enjoys by being able to experience the joys
of life offset by the burdens that the child endures by experiencing
life while suffering from severe handicaps. It should immediately
be obvious that a child could only recover if the handicaps out-
weighed the benefits of being alive. To prove this to the trier of
fact, the handicaps would need to be very severe indeed. This
factor distinguishes the action for wrongful life from personal
injury actions. In the latter, the plaintiff seeks to recover damages
caused by the injury itself, however slight. It is the defendant's
negligence that caused the injury itself. In wrongful life cases,
however, the negligence has not caused the injury, but instead has
caused the wrongful life. A life can only be said to be "wrongful"
if the pain of living is so great that it outweighs the benefits of life
that a child usually enjoys.
The practical effect of this proposed measure overcomes
several of the traditional barriers behind which courts have hidden
to deny the action. Interestingly, courts are able to place values
on life, while declaring that it is impossible to evaluate non-
existence. Using the suggested measure of damages for wrongful
life actions makes it unnecessary to delve into weighing life against
non-existence. Instead, it simply asks a court to measure damages
on the basis of weighing the burdens of life with its benefits.
This solution ensures that a child will be able to seek recovery
only in cases of exceptionally severe handicaps. Prior to consider-
ing the amount of damages, a court will have to be convinced that
the particular child was severely disabled before it actually suffers
a 'wrongful life.' If the burdens do not outweigh the benefits, the
court could then, and only then, declare that this child sustained
no damages directly flowing from the doctor's negligence. Turpin
recognized that, where the affliction was deafness, it was highly
unlikely for a jury to find that life with the disability was worse
than no life at all.218 If the disability was sufficiently serious to
outweigh the joys of living, damages would be available.219
218. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 954.
219. Id.
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Several commentators express their fear that children with
minor birth defects would be overcompensated while those with
the most horrendous injuries would be under-compensated.22 °
The argument articulated above renders these fears groundless.
These criticisms fail to recognize that wrongful life actions do not
compensate for the injuries. Rather, the compensation is for a life
in which the burdens outweigh the benefits. Unless a child suffers
from a severe handicap, he would not be able to show any
"damage" that he endured as a result of the negligence. The
burdens of his life would not be found to outweigh its benefits. To
understand the nature of the action, this distinction must be
remembered. Damages are awarded not because the doctor
inflicted the injury, but because the doctor negligently caused the
injury suffered.
The use of this kind of balancing test is not a novelty in tort
law. The Restatement of Torts specifically recognizes a balancing
test as the legitimate way to calculate damages in cases where a
defendant has caused both a benefit and a burden.22' Further-
more, the weighing of benefits against the burdens of life is used
to calculate damages in cases brought by parents for the "wrongful
birth" of their child. Even courts that have denied claims for
wrongful life freely use the suggested measure to calculate
damages in wrongful birth cases. 222 This shows not only that this
measure is a plausible measure of damages, but also that it is
illogical and inconsistent not to use it. Using this test further
undermines any supposed legal irrebuttable presumption that the
joys of life in any form always outweigh its burdens.
An award to parents for the "wrongful birth" of their child
does not consider the child's own pain and suffering. "[O]nce the
right of parents to collect for their own economic losses is
accepted, it becomes difficult not to allow the child to recover for
his own injuries directly., 223  Furthermore, the balancing ap-
220. See, e.g., Melinda A. Roberts, Distinguishing Wrongful from "Rightful" Life, 59 J.
CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 70 (1990).
221. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 869 (1979). "When the defendant's tortious
conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred
a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit
conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable." Id.
222. See, inter alia, Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1971) (holding that the value
of a child to its parents outweighed the cost of its rearing).
223. Capron, supra note 187, at 659.
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proach suggested above not only enables the child to recover for
her own wrongful life, but also ensures that the physician is held
legally liable, but only to the extent of the harm that his negligent
conduct actually caused. Moreover, allowing an action for
wrongful birth overcomes the fears that the action implicitly
declares that a disabled life is not worth living. Calculating
damages by the proposed balancing manner allows a court to
provide the necessary recovery to a disabled person, while still
taking into account all of the benefits she can enjoy from life.
Once it is recognized that recovery should be based on a
balancing test of benefits and burdens, no logical reason exists to
limit damages to those damages that are "special," as was done in
Turpin and subsequent cases. Relief in those cases could only be
granted to those genuinely able to show that they were experien-
cing a "wrongful life." This showing is only possible in the rare
cases involving children born with severe handicaps. Once this
threshold requirement is met, it seems illogical to deny damages
for both special and general damages resulting from the condition.
If recovery is limited to these individuals, there is no principled
basis on which to deny them all damages flowing from their
wrongful lives. Pain and suffering is as much a reality as unan-
ticipated financial expenditure.
D. Policy Factors
Though the judiciary obviously is guided by considerations of
policy, their decisions should be based on neutral components of
the tort law. The "policy" arguments of individual judges may not
be in accord either with the sentiments of society as a whole, or
with what generally is considered "best" for society.22 It is
therefore necessary to examine the underlying policy arguments in
this area and to evaluate whether they are sufficient to deny a
cause of action for wrongful life.
1. A Wrong in Need of Redress
Critics of the cause of action for wrongful life are concerned
about the intricate details of the legal theory surrounding the
action and, as a result, fail to view its essential components. "The
224. See Weir, supra note 124, at 227. "'Against public policy' is a judicial utterance
which, being interpreted, means: 'We feel that this would be a bad thing, and we hope that
others feel the same, though we have no means of knowing."' Id.
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reality of the 'wrongful life' concept is that such a plaintiff both
exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others."225 Legislators
must decide whether the law is prepared to allow negligent parties
to escape liability completely and whether the law should deny a
critically disabled child the desperately needed support. The
enlightened dissent in Gleitman argued that accepting this position
permitted "a wrong with serious consequential injury to go wholly
unredressed. That provides no deterrent to professional irrespon-
sibility and is neither just nor compatible with expanding principles
of liability in the field of torts.,
226
Today, medicine is more advanced than it was at the time of
the Gleitman decision in 1967. As knowledge about genetics
increases, there are fewer reasons to excuse doctors from all
liability in these instances. Moreover, the question is not only a
legal one; it concerns ethics as well. If a child is born with
debilitating defects as a result of the negligence of the doctor, that
child has "a strong moral claim for supplemental child support...
[t]he tortfeasor's misconduct has irreversibly changed the status
quo. A child has been born, and that child needs support. '227
It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider whether other policy
factors in this area are sufficiently strong to override that funda-
mental and essential need.
2. Emotive Factors
A subject rarely encapsulates so many sensitive ethical issues
without producing emotional responses from the judiciary.
Theoretically, the legal system is objective. This objectivity does
not, however, prevent an occasional subjective outburst, thinly
veiled in the casing of legal analysis. Such remarks are proffered
on both sides of the controversy.
Lord Justice Griffiths declared that "such a claim seems
utterly offensive; there should be rejoicing that the hospital's
mistake bestowed the gift of life upon the child. ' '2' This opinion
is no less subjective than the classification by the majority in
Curlender that the birth of a baby into such circumstances is a
225. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 828 (1980).
226. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (N.J. 1967).
227. Philip F. Peters, Rethinking Wrongful Life: Bridging the Boundary Between Tort
and Family Law, 67 TUL. L. REV. 397, 398 (1992).
228. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1193.
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"catastrophic result." '229 Other exclamations demonstrate far less
restraint, calling a wrongful life claim a "Hitlerian elimination of
the unfit,"'2 ° and describing its proponents as reflecting a "Fas-
cist-Orwellian societal attitude of genetic purity.
2 31
Critics of a wrongful life action are disturbed by the percep-
tion that a claim for wrongful life establishes a child's right "to be
born as a whole, functional human being. 2 32  Contrary to the
views of the opponents of this right, it is not novel to tort law.
The Grodin court held that a child is entitled to damages from
anyone who wrongfully interferes with her "legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body.
' ' 3
Recognizing the legal right, however, is not the most impor-
tant point of the wrongful life claim. More significantly, the
assertion that a wrongful life action must recognize the right to be
born fully functional is misguided. Such an assertion overlooks the
fact that any such action would have to be based upon a showing
of negligence. Far from being a claim for the right to be born
"normal," it is an action to ensure that a child is born "without the
handicap of a readily preventable, serious genetic defect." '234
It has been suggested that such mischaracterizations arise from
the emotive language of the name of the claim itself.235 One
author opined that "wrongful life" is "a clear case of a meritorious
cause of action being denied because of its ill-chosen label.",1
6
It is less partial to name the action what it really is, "genetic
malpractice," and not label it with the potentially disturbing term
"wrongful life." 7  Some of the emotional prejudices associated
with the claim would be eliminated if one recognized that the
claim has far more to do with medical malpractice than with
disrespect for life itself Calling life "wrongful" causes, in the
minds of some, denigration of that quality.
The action neither implicitly nor explicitly calls for active
euthanasia in these circumstances. Nor does it state that someone
229. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 815.
230. Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 379 (Wis. 1975).
231. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
232. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
233. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. 1980).
234. Editorial, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 799, 800 (1971) (emphasis added).
235. Maxine A. Sonnenburg, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a
Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 477 (1982).
236. Id. at 509.
237. Id.
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who suffers from an impaired existence should be denied protec-
tion under the law. In fact, it provides for the exact opposite. The
action simply states that the child, through her parents, should be
the one to decide whether she wishes to enter a life during which
she will suffer disabilities. This action simply affirms that "choices
about health care lie with the patient, not with the provider of
care."238
In this respect, it is apparent that the court's reluctance to
recognize the claim is simply another example of the legal system's
sanctioning of medical paternalism. The affluent medical profes-
sion is afforded exclusive protection at the expense of the usually
powerless patient. Certainly, it is better for society to recognize
that "the law can best protect potential children by not in effect
immunizing from liability those in the medical field providing
inadequate guidance to the children's parents, and by offering a
means of redress for the harm to the children.,
239
An examination of early U.S. decisions highlights the extent
to which they were influenced by the illegal status of abortion.2l
Abortion no longer bars a claim for wrongful life in England,24'
and, after Roe v. Wade,242 it is not a bar in the United States
either. Many of the more recent wrongful life decisions, however,
tend to focus on the emotive abortion issue, though in some cases
unintentionally.
In McKay, Lord Justice Ackner was not prepared to impose
a duty on the doctor to inform the mother of the "desirability" of
an abortion.243  Not only does this utterly fail to recognize the
true nature of the duty owed, it also misstates the facts. The
doctor did not espouse the value of an abortion, as the court of
appeal leads one to believe. The doctor's negligence arose when
he assured the mother that an abortion was unnecessary. One
author suggests that an unstated reason for the courts' denial of
these actions is their reluctance to condone abortion in any
way.244 Naturally, abortion is more easily accepted if the child
brings the action. This reluctance, perhaps, explains why a
238. Capron, supra note 187, at 653.
239. Id. at 654.
240. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
241. Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87 (Eng.).
242. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
243. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166.
244. Teff, supra note 186, at 434.
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parent's claim for 'wrongful birth' is allowed while the child's own
action is denied.
Courts and commentators continue to mischaracterize the
action. The action for wrongful life is not considered to be in
accordance with public policy because it is tantamount to proclaim-
ing that it is preferable to keep disabled persons from society.
Allowing a wrongful life claim "would mean regarding the life of
a disabled child as not only less valuable than the life of a normal
child, but so much less valuable that it was not worth preserv-
ing.'245 This misconception is so outrageous that it is almost
inconceivable that it could genuinely be held. A court, however,
may desire to symbolize the action. It must be remembered that
the child's claim does not seek an end to her life, nor does it
attempt to prevent conception in general.2" This Article does
not suggest that a disabled person should be killed, nor does this
Article make the offensive proclamation that a person with birth
defects has no right to exist. On the contrary, the action precisely
determines the facts surrounding a child's existence. A child has
negligently been born in a defective state; the child is alive and
needs support. Contrary to showing disrespect for life itself, the
entire action is based on providing assistance to the living. As was
insightfully recognized in Procanik, a wrongful life action seeks no
more than to "respond to the call of the living for help in bearing
the burden of their affliction."247
Critics who concentrate on the need to value the sanctity of
life fail to realize, ironically, that proponents of the action agree
with them. No better current example exists than the Turpin case,
where the court, in allowing the claim, confirmed it valued "the
worth and sanctity of less-than-perfect life. '' 21 The court further
held that it would be difficult to understand how awarding
damages to alleviate the suffering of a severely disabled child
could possibly disavow the sanctity of her life.249 Paradoxically,
allowing such a claim signifies nothing more than the fact that the
child is entitled to receive the full measure of legal and non-legal
rights and privileges that are accorded to all members of society.
245. McKay, 1 Q.B. at 1180.
246. See Teff, supra note 186, at 434.
247. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984).
248. 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982).
249. Id.
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Rather than showing a disrespect of life, allowing remedies in
these situations recognizes life's value. The idea that society
denigrates the disabled by providing them with social benefits once
they have been born is an idea that has been obsolete for years.
Likewise, it is no longer believed that providing people who suffer
from disabilities with support encourages societal intolerance of
them. On the contrary, attitudes like these generally reflect the
true merits of a compassionate society. Furthermore, because the
child is already alive and suffering from the condition, "any
feelings of rejection he might experience are more likely to stem
from being deprived in fact of security and affection in his early
years, a prospect as, if not more, likely in the absence of compen-
sation.'250
Some critics inexplicably regard the action for wrongful life as
signifying societal loathing of the disabled. One author repeats a
familiar misconception of critics by declaring that "the growing
awareness of disabled people as productive members of society
and the legislation passed to aid disabled persons should not be
undermined by a judicial determination that entire groups of
people have 'wrongful' lives."25' This attitude may appear to be
somewhat extraordinary. An action for wrongful life is not a value
judgment about the quality of the lives of disabled people in
general. It is simply a legal action that compensates those who
suffer from disabilities that arose out of the negligence of a
medical practitioner. One critic's assertion dangerously confuses
an individual case with a universal truth. Without a showing of
negligence, one could not bring a claim alleging that her life was
"wrongful," even if she experienced the same condition.
This rule is easily demonstrated by the following hypothetical:
A man goes to the hospital because he needs his appendix
removed. As a result of negligence by the hospital, he is released
with his infected appendix still in place. He discovers that he has
been circumcised. If a court were to award him damages based on
the negligence in his case, it is unthinkable that this decision would
be considered a negative declaration about the lives of people who
have been circumcised voluntarily or without negligence on the
part of the physician. The fact that this man should never have
250. See Teff, supra note 186, at 438.
251. Gallagher, supra note 216, at 1328.
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been circumcised does not suggest that anything is wrong with
circumcised people in general.
While the gravity of the hypothetical does not parallel the
nature of a "wrongful life" claim, the logic and legal principles of
the two situations are identical. Injuries that would not have
arisen without negligence warrant a remedy on account of that
negligence. Damages are awarded not for the condition itself, but
for the negligence that brought the condition into existence.
Therefore, wrongful life claims are not judgments about the lives
of disabled persons. Rather, they are simply statements about the
negligence of doctors.
Emotional outbursts are fairly irrational when not logically
supported. The reasons proposed by critics for denying a wrongful
life claim does not withstand even a modicum of analysis. It
remains to be seen whether other "policy" grounds contain any
substance to dispute the availability of the action.
3. Floodgates
The wrongful life action has been denied on the grounds that
it would be impossible "to determine the degree of deformity
necessary to state a claim for relief."'252 Critics argue that the
courts could be flooded by an endless wave of wrongful life
claims.53  Neither of these argume, however, is valid. It has
already been shown that, to receive damages in a wrongful life
case, a child must demonstrate that the burdens of her life
outweigh the benefits. This burden will be extremely difficult to
prove in any case where the handicap suffered is not exceptionally
severe. Thus, cases would only come to court in rare instances.
The idea that cases will flood the court system miscomprehends
both the nature of the claim and the remedy.
Another argument questions the ability of courts to determine
"how gravely deformed" '254 a child must be before he can bring
the action. Critics concede that formulating an exact test to be
applied in every case, irrespective of individual circumstances, is
impossible. This lack of precision, however, is an advantage, as
with common law, and allows for flexibility in individual cases.
The tort law system is contoured around concepts like "reason-
252. Elliot v. Brown, 361 So.2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978).
253. Id.
254. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1193 n.66.
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ableness" and "probability," both of which are incapable of precise
definition. This lack of precision does not merit the denial of
actions in other cases. Particularly in wrongful life claims, the
standard to be applied is whether the burden of life outweighs its
benefits. In general, the legal system acknowledges that it is
dealing with persons with exceptionally severe handicaps, although
there are grey areas in particular cases. It is important that the
law retain a certain amount of flexibility to deal with these
unforeseen situations. A minimal amount of imprecision is
preferable to rigidity and subsequent injustice.
4. "Dissatisfied life" cases
Some scholars who criticize wrongful death actions rely on a
line of cases that misclassify the action. Cases have arisen where
healthy children sue their parents for being born into circumstanc-
es that they perceive to be undesirable. The best known example
of this type of claim arose when an illegitimate child sued his
father for his illegitimate status in life.255 The Illinois Court of
Appeals understandably denied relief on the ground that if such an
action were allowed, "one might seek damages for being born of
a certain color, another because of race; one for being born with
a hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate family
characteristics; one for being born into a large and destitute family,
another because a parent has an unsavory reputation. ,256 The
decision has been followed by a line of similar cases, none of
which have permitted a "dissatisfied life" claim.257
This type of action is very different from the action for
wrongful life, and the reasons for rejecting the claim should be
obvious. It would be impossible for a child to demonstrate
255. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Il. 1963).
256. Id. at 858.
257. Williams v. New York, 223 N.E.2d 343 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that "[bleing born
under one set of circumstances rather than another or to one pair of parents rather than
another is not a suable wrong that is cognisable in court."); Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d
9 (1974) (finding that policy considerations with regard to illegitimate children were not
the same as those concerning physically disabled children); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d
8 (1975) (finding that the value of human life outweighs any damage that might be said
to follow from the mere fact of birth); Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (holding
that the only existing 'damage' arose from the birth of the child itself. The circumstances
of the case did not, in any case, merit an action because the child was said to be "a joy to
his mother" and was "happy and healthy in every respect"); Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 84 (1983) (denying an action where there was no physical impairment).
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satisfactorily to a court that his life was so affected by the
unfortunate circumstances of his birth that life's burdens out-
weighed its benefits. From a policy point of view, it is clear that
the floodgates inevitably would open. If every aspect of a
dissatisfied life were the subject of litigation, the court doors could
never be closed.258
II. WRONGFUL BIRTH
A. What is "Wrongful Birth"?
The generic term "wrongful birth" has been used to encom-
pass a wide variety of situations. These situations typically involve
actions brought by parents who allege that the negligence of a
physician led to the birth of a child that they did not want or with
which they are in some way dissatisfied. Commentators have
attempted to classify the action for purposes of clarity. Those
cases involving parents who gave birth to an unwanted, but healthy
baby, are labeled "wrongful conception" or "wrongful pregnancy."
"Wrongful birth" encompasses cases in which a child is born with
a handicap.
2 59
An action for wrongful birth arises out of the same facts as an
action for wrongful life. The only difference is the plaintiff
bringing the action. Here, it is the parents, not the child, who
bring the claim. The basis of the parents' action is the defendant's
negligence, which resulted in the birth of a child that is born
physically or mentally disabled because of a genetic defect for
which the defendant is not responsible. Liability can arise where
a medical practitioner fails to recognize or explain the genetic basis
of a condition,' 6 or where a diagnostic technology is not offered
in an appropriate and timely fashion to enable informed reproduc-
tive choices by the parents. 261  The legal issue is whether to
recognize, as a legal right compensable by tortious damages, the
ability of parents to prevent the birth of a child whom they
subsequently discover to be "defective.
2 62
258. "Dissatisfied life" claims are an entirely different species of case, and the fact that
they have been denied is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
259. See, e.g., EDWARD KIONKA, TORTS 231 (2d ed. 1993).
260. Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982).
261. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981).
262. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 656 P.2d 483, 488 (Cal. 1983). "The parents'
right to prevent a defective child and the correlative duty flowing from that right is the
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An action for wrongful pregnancy arises where the defen-
dant's negligent conduct failed to prevent the birth of a healthy,
but unwanted child. This situation can arise in the following
scenarios: (1) where a physician negligently performs a vasec-tomy,26 or when a physician provides any other type of ineffec-
tive contraception,26 and the parents conceive, as a result; (2)
where a physician negligently fails to diagnose a pregnancy,
thereby denying a mother the choice of an abortion at a timely
stage;2 or (3) where a doctor negligently performs an abortion,
and the birth of a healthy child results.
266
It is simplistic to say that the necessary tort elements-duty,
breach, causation, and damages-must be fulfilled for these actions
to succeed. On both sides of the Atlantic, however, the law
conspicuously fails to properly analyze these essential tort
components. In several instances, it appears that courts simply
assume that a remedy should be awarded, without considering how
these actions fit within the traditional framework. Little energy is
expended to create any logical consistency in the reasoning and
outcome of wrongful life, wrongful birth, and wrongful pregnancy
cases, despite. their overwhelming factual similarities. Furthermore,
the law within each of these elements has been formulated on a
piecemeal basis, with an emphasis on the individual case rather
than on ensuring justice for the whole.
Once again, it is useful to compare English case law with cases
in the United States because the same legal questions have arisen
in both countries, resulting in both similar and different holdings.
American cases are infinitely more numerous and span a much
longer time period. It is particularly interesting to compare and
contrast U.S. and British decisions to determine whether the
quantity of U.S. decisions spanning decades improves the level of
reasoning used in American jurisdictions.
heart of the wrongful birth action."
263. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 425 N.E.2d 968 (I11. 981).
264. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1971).
265. Rinard v. Biczak, 441 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. 1989).
266. Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301 (Va. 1986).
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B. Judicial Responses
1. In England
The issue of "wrongful pregnancy" in England did not arise
until a series of conflicting cases in the early 1980s eventually
determined that a remedy was possible to parents who gave birth
to a healthy child. Recovery was more easily attained, however,
in those cases involving children who suffered from disabilities.
The main disputed issue involved whether parents could claim
damages, not only for the negligently performed procedures
themselves, but also for raising a child that they did not want. It
is surprising that this important and controversial issue has yet to
be considered by the House of Lords.
Sciuriaga v. Powell was the first case of its kind, but the main
issue, whether a parent could recover the costs of a child's
upbringing, was not considered.2 67 In Sciuriaga, the birth of a
healthy child followed a negligently performed abortion.268
Damages were awarded to the parents for the failed procedure
itself, based on ordinary principles of medical negligence.
2 69
Public policy issues were neither raised nor discussed.
Three years later, however, the central issue, whether the law
should recognize the right of a parent to receive compensation
when a healthy baby is born, was thoroughly analyzed and rejected
on public policy grounds. Udale v. Bloomsbury Area Health
Authority270 concerned a negligently performed sterilization. As
a result of the negligently performed operation, both parents
incorrectly assumed that they no longer needed other forms of
contraception, and subsequently, a healthy child was born to
them.271 The action was analyzed as a "wrongful birth" case,
although it may now be more clearly identified as a case for
"wrongful pregnancy.' ' 272
In rejecting the action, Justice Jupp emphasized what he
considered to be overriding arguments of public policy.273 These
267. [1980] CA Transcript 597.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. [1983] 2 All E.R. 522.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 523.
273. Id. at 530-31.
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actions would place an excessive financial burden upon the medical
profession and could likely lead to a lowering of professional
standards, pressuring doctors to recommend abortions for fear of
potential litigation.274 Furthermore, the action could have vast
social implications by disrupting family life and causing bitterness
that would result between parent and child.2 75 The court wanted
to avoid the potential that a child could learn that a court had
publicly declared his life to be a mistake and that he was unwant-
ed.276 Moreover, ascertaining damages was problematic. Dam-
ages are calculated by offsetting the joys of having a child against
the financial burdens and other hardships it causes. 2 7 Thus, a
loving mother would not be able to recover anything, whereas "a
plaintiff who nurtures bitterness in her heart ... would be entitled
to large damages., 27 The opinion that there should be rejoicing,
and not dismay, at the birth of a healthy child was supported by
arguments about the sanctity of human life.
279
When the same issue was subsequently considered, however,
the sanctity of life argument was held inapplicable to the birth of
a child with disabilities. Emeh v. Kensington Chelsea and Westmin-
ster Health Authority involved a negligently performed vasectomy,
which resulted in plaintiff's pregnancy.2° After refusing to have
an abortion, the plaintiff gave birth to a congenitally deformed
child.28' The court of appeals indicated that a stronger argument
existed for awarding damages in cases of deformed children as
opposed to cases involving healthy ones.2 The plaintiff subse-
quently was awarded damages for full child-rearing costs, without
limiting them by balancing the differences between the needs of a
normal and an "abnormal" child.283  The court of appeals,
however, declined to create a policy that precluded the award of
damages to healthy, but unwanted, children in similar cases.
2 4
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Udale v. Bloomburg Area Health Auth., [1983] 2 All E.R. 522, 530-31.
277. Id. at 531.
278. Id. at 531.
279. Id.
280. [1984] 3 All E.R. 1044.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1050.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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In Thake, a railway worker, and father of five children,
underwent a sterilization operation to ensure that he would not be
able to have more.8 5 The vasectomy was negligently performed,
and his wife became pregnant once again, giving birth to a healthy
girl. 86 In allowing an action for wrongful pregnancy, and recog-
nizing damages for child-rearing costs, Justice Pain refuted the
arguments of Justice Jupp in Udale. Justice Pain did not agree
that the birth of a child was always a blessing, as evidenced by the
availability and frequent use of birth control methods, family
planning, and abortion.28 7  Furthermore, the learned judge
believed that awarding damages would make the girl feel rejection
later in life, as she would perceive the remedy only as a "means of
having made life somewhat easier for her family., 288 The test to
be applied in calculating damages was familiar, the extent to which
the burden of having a child was offset by the joys that the child
provided to the family.
289
In each of the above cases, there was no dispute over
awarding damages for the pain and suffering caused by the failed
procedures themselves. The main controversy involved the issue
whether parents could additionally recover the expense of raising
the unwanted child. More recent cases have answered that
question in the affirmative.
Allen v. Bloomsbury Health Authority" provides a useful
recent summary of the applicable principles. In Allen, the health
authority negligently failed to diagnose Mrs. Allen's four-week
pregnancy at the time they performed a sterilization operation.291
Mrs. Allen alleged, and the defendants conceded, that had the
pregnancy been diagnosed at the time of the operation, she would
have had an abortion. 2  The pregnancy was only detected,
however, after seventeen weeks, at which time Mrs. Allen felt that
285. Thake, [1984] 2 All E.R. 513.
286. Id. at 517.
287. Id. at 525.
288. Id. at 526.
289. I
290. Allen v. Bloomsbury Health Auth., [1993] 1 All E.R. 651; Fish v. Wilcox and
Gwent Health Auth., [1993] 13 B.M.L.R. 134.
291. Allen, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 651.
292. Id.
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it was too late to terminate her pregnancy.293 The baby girl was
born completely healthy.
29
The claim had never been considered by the House of Lords,
but Justice Brooke attempted to promulgate the legal principles
that he could discern from the few first instance cases and
appellate pronouncements that existed. He held that if the
negligence of a doctor resulted in an unplanned birth, the mother
was entitled to recover damages for the pain and suffering
associated with the pregnancy, as well as damages for the financial
loss caused by raising the child to adulthood.295 Damages for the
significant effort and exhaustion that a mother might suffer in
bringing up a child was not recoverable.2 This burden was
offset by the joy of raising a healthy child. 97  This principle,
however, did not apply where the child suffered from disabilities.
In these cases, "the law is willing to recognize a claim for general
damages in respect of the foreseeable additional anxiety, stress and
burden involved in bringing up a disabled child, which is not
treated as being extinguished by any countervailing benefit. ' '29
8
Therefore, while the law in this area is unsettled, it is clear
that when a procedure has been negligently performed and it leads
to the birth of a child, parents have a cause of action. The court
of appeals has stated that this cause of action is amplified when
the child is born with a disability. Wrongful birth decisions,
however, have recognized both the action and the award of child-
rearing damages for healthy children as well.
English courts have adopted a different approach when
considering the more typical case of "wrongful birth," cases
involving the negligent failure of a doctor to diagnose a disability
in the fetus, which led to continued gestation and the ultimate
birth of a disabled child. While the facts of the two cases
discussed below, were based upon a "wrongful birth," and though
the claim was ultimately rejected, the rationale does not shed any
light upon the present discussion. Both cases were decided on
their own particular facts, and the holdings were somewhat
unusual.
293. Id.
294. Id
295. Id. at 651.
296. Allen v. Bloomsbury Health Auth., [1993] 1 All E.R. 651, 652.
297. Id. at 651.
298. Id. at 657.
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In Salih v. Enfield Health Authority,2" a child was born
suffering from congenital rubella syndrome as a result of a health
authority's failure to diagnose and warn the mother that her child
could be affected by rubella.300 This negligence resulted in the
inability of the child's mother to terminate her pregnancy. In
finding that the parents were not entitled to damages, the court
used reasoning that one author has termed "bizarre., 30 1  In
determining that these parents had not suffered any financial loss,
the court relied on evidence that showed that the parents would
have had a fourth child had this one, their third, not been disabled.
The parents intended to have four children, and, because they only
had three, they were not entitled to any damages.3" Whether or
not one agrees with the result of the case, its ration decidendi is
not extraordinary. Whether the parents would have sought to
have additional children once their disabled child was born
absolutely was, and should have remained, a matter for them, and
not a concern of either the defendants or the court.
In the other case, Rance v. Mid-Downs Area Health Authority,
a boy was born with a very serious handicap, spina bifida, allegedly
caused by the negligence of a hospital radiologist who did not
arrange for further scans.3 °3 These scans would have confirmed,
or allayed suspicions, that the child was in fact suffering from his
condition.3' Had the child's mother been completely informed,
the mother would have had her pregnancy terminated.3 5 The
claim was rejected, but once again on grounds that do not assist
the present discussion. Justice Brooke failed to find any negli-
gence on behalf of the radiologist. °' Furthermore, he stated that
even if he had, he would not have allowed the action on the basis
that the mother was at a stage of her pregnancy that was too
advanced to lawfully have it terminated,3u7 a statement now
299. [1991] 3 All E.R. 400.
300. Id
301. P.R. Glazebrook, Unseemliness Compounded by Injustice, 51 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 226
(1992).
302. Salih, 3 All E.R. at 400-01.
303. Rance v. Mid-Downs Area Health Auth., [1991] 2 W.L.R. 159.
304. Id. at 168.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 192-93.
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rendered obsolete because of recent amendments to the Abortion
Act of 1967.' °'
While at first glance it appears that English law does not
recognize "wrongful birth" actions in a typical case involving
negligent genetic diagnosis that results in the birth of a disabled
child, it is apparent that the courts have never considered this
claim on any principled or logical basis. The English position
makes it significantly more interesting to examine the position in
the United States, and it makes it challenging to take a fresh look
at the type of considerations that should rightfully influence this
area of the law.
2. The United States
The courts in the United States have also approached
"wrongful pregnancy" and "wrongful birth" cases differently. The
prevailing view when a healthy child is born is to allow parents to
recover limited damages for the pain associated with the failed
procedures, but very few courts allow recovery of expenses for
child-rearing costs.3°9 In fact, of the thirty-six jurisdictions that
allow wrongful pregnancy claims, twenty-eight deny damages for
child-rearing as a matter of law. 31° In those minority jurisdictions
where recovery for child-rearing has been allowed, some states
insist that those costs should be offset by the emotional benefits
attained by the parents, 311 whereas others allow full recovery
without any such offset.312
Two of the leading cases in this area succinctly demonstrate
the different approaches that are taken by the courts, influenced
by whether the child is born healthy or disabled. In Cockrum v.
Baumgartner, a doctor negligently performed a vasectomy on the
plaintiff.3" The doctor was further negligent when he assured
the Cockrums that a sperm test conducted by the laboratory
showed that there was no longer any live sperm present.31 4 If
the doctor exercised due care and skill, he would have known that
308. Id.
309. See Kionka, supra note 259, at 231.
310. Lisa A. Podewils, Traditional Tort Principles and Wrongful Conception Child-
Rearing Damages, 73 B.U. L. REV. 407, 408 (1993).
311. Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4-6 (Mass. 1990).
312. Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 613-14 (N.M. 1991).
313. 447 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ill. 1983).
314. Id. at 385.
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the laboratory report revealed that the vasectomy, in fact, had
been medically unsuccessful. The plaintiffs claimed that but for
the physician's negligence, Mrs. Cockrum would never have
become pregnant.315  As a result, she gave birth to a healthy
child.
The Supreme Court of Illinois recognized a cause of action
against a physician where it was alleged that because of the
doctor's negligence the plaintiff conceived or gave birth.' 6
Damages in these cases, however, were measured by considering
the expenses of the unsuccessful operation, the pain and suffering
involved, any medical complications caused by the pregnancy, the
costs of delivery, lost wages, and loss of consortium.317 The court
acknowledged the dispute over whether the plaintiffs could recover
the costs of raising a healthy child as damages.318 The court
adopted the majority view, holding that no recovery for child-
rearing expenses would be allowed when a healthy child was
born. 319 The joy of giving birth to a healthy child offset any
conceivable loss. 320 It was contrary to public policy for parents
to devalue the lives of their children in order to recover damag-
es.3
2 1
Speck v. Finegold22 involved the birth of an unhealthy child.
The case provides an interesting contrast. As in Cockrum, Mrs.
Speck gave birth to a child conceived as the result of a negligently
performed vasectomy on her husband.3 23 A subsequent attempt-
ed abortion was also negligently carried out.324 This negligence
led to the birth of a baby daughter who suffered from neurofibro-
matosis, a disorder caused by a genetic defect in Mr. Speck. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that the action was based
upon the birth of a "defective" child.3 25  Accordingly, parents
could recover, not only for the pain and suffering attributable to
the failed procedures, as in Cockrum, but also for child-rearing
315. Id.
316. Id. at 388.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ii. 1983).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
323. Id. at 113.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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expenses, which had been explicitly denied in the Illinois case.326
Furthermore, the court allowed recovery for emotional distress
alleged to have been suffered in giving birth to, and having to look
after, a "defective" child.327 The greater inclination of the courts
to award child-rearing and emotional distress damages in cases
involving the birth of children suffering from disabilities is
mirrored in each case discussed in this section.328
In cases where a doctor has negligently failed to diagnose a
pregnancy, thereby removing a mother's option to abort, the courts
generally have denied a claim for child-rearing costs where the
infant is healthy. In both Rinard v. Biczak329 and Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co. ,330 the courts expressly declared that child-
326. Id. at 113.
327. Id. at 114.
328. For examples of cases that follow the distinction alluded to in Cockrum and Speck
as between healthy and unhealthy children arising out of negligently performed
sterilizations and abortions, see, inter alia, Weintraub v. Brown, 470 N.E.2d 634 (N.Y.
1983) (denying damages for child-rearing costs arising from a failed vasectomy on policy
grounds where child was healthy); Ramey v. Fassoulas, 414 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1982) (denying
child-rearing costs arising from a failed vasectomy because child was healthy; had child
been born with substantial physical or mental defects, the parents would have been able
to recover special medical and educational expenses associated with raising such a child
to majority); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984) (holding that parent could not
maintain an action for child-rearing expenses resulting from a negligently performed
abortion as the child was born normal and healthy); Johnson v. University Hosp. of
Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370 (Ohio 1989) (limiting extent of damages due to failed vasecto-
my in accordance with the policy consideration that the birth of a healthy child cannot be
an injury to her parents); Goforth v. Porter Medical Assoc., Inc., 755 P.2d 678 (Okla. 1988)
(denying recovery for the rearing costs of a healthy child due to failed sterilization); Terrell
v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1973) (denying recovery for rearing costs of a healthy child
due to failed sterilization because the emotional benefits it gives the parents far outweighs
their economic burdens). Contrast the position in cases that arise on the same facts, but
the result in the birth of a child who suffers from disabilities: Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d
883 (Conn. 1982) (holding that parents could recover for mother's medical expenses and
pain and suffering occasioned by the failed sterilization; for medical care necessitated by
the child's orthopedic disability; and for the costs of raising the child to her majority);
Stribling v. De Quevedo, 422 A.2d 239 (Pa. 1980) (allowing recovery for mother's lost
earnings, physical pain and suffering and emotional distress incident to negligent
sterilization; allowing father's claim for damages incident to birth and rearing of his son
born with dextrocardia granting recovery for his mother's medical expenses; denying
recovery for emotional and mental distress); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So.2d 1151
(La. 1988) (holding that parents could recover for expenses incurred during pregnancy and
delivery, mother's pain and suffering, father's loss of consortium, service and society, as
well as their emotional and mental distress due to failed bilateral tubal ligation resulting
in child born with albinism).
329. 441 N.W. 44 (Mich. 1989).
330. 219 N.W.2d 242 (Wisc. 1974).
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rearing costs were not recoverable as damages in cases where
healthy children were born. It was contrary to public policy to
allow such claims when the birth of a healthy child was assumed
to be a welcome addition to the family.331 This position is vastly
different, however, where the physician, while detecting the
pregnancy, negligently failed to diagnose or predict the effect of
either a condition or a genetic defect that led to the birth of a
child who suffers from disabilities. Numerous cases have allowed
parents to recover damages for both child-rearing and emotional
distress damages in situations where a doctor has negligently failed
to detect the presence of rubella, or failed to warn of its potential
harm to the unborn fetus.
Blake v. Cruz332 provides an example of a child born with
congenital defects following a failure to diagnose the mother's
rubella. The court awarded damages for the costs of medical and
hospital care for the child, as well as for its support and mainte-
nance not only up to, but beyond, the age of majority.333 Fur-
thermore, the parents were awarded damages for the emotional
distress of having given birth to a disabled child.334
The Michigan Court of Appeals reached a similar result in
Eisbrenner v. Stanley.335 In Eisbrenner, a deformed child was
born as the result of a failed rubella diagnosis. 336 While child-
rearing damages were not awarded for the period after the age of
majority, the parents were recompensed for medical expenses
incurred due to the child's disabilities. 337 Again, damages were
awarded for the emotional distress allegedly caused by the disabled
child.338
Not all similar cases have allowed recovery for emotional
distress. It is unusual, however, to find a case where courts do not
award damages beyond those caused by the immediate effects of
the negligence itself, despite the fact that this has often been the
331. Id. at 244; see also Rinard, 441 N.W. at 44.
332. 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984).
333. Id. at 320.
334. Id.
335. 308 N.w.2d 209 (Mich. 1981).
336. Id. at 210.
337. Id. at 214.
338. Id.
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result in cases involving healthy babies, as previously demonstrat-
ed. 339
Similar differences exist in the treatment of healthy and
unhealthy children born in cases where the pregnancy itself is
detected, but a defective gene or chromosome within the fetus is
negligently misdiagnosed. Recovery for child-rearing expenses has
been denied where the failure to diagnose the pregnancy led to the
birth of a healthy child.3 °  In cases where the child is born
disabled, denial of child rearing expenses is noticeably in the
minority. Two cases involving Tay-Sachs illustrates this
approach. The court in Naccash v. Burger allowed parents to
recover damages for expenses incurred in the care and treatment
of their afflicted child.341 The court further held that the circum-
stances of the case permitted recovery for emotional distress as
well.342  Similarly, in Goldberg v. Ruskin, 3 the child also was
born with the Tay-Sachs disease. The court explicitly stated that
the reasons for denying costs of rearing a normal and healthy child
should not prevent the parents of an abnormal child from
recovering the expenses reasonably necessary for the care and
treatment of their child's physical impairment.' Furthermore,
the plaintiffs were allowed to plead facts that entitled them to
recover damages for emotional distress.
In Lloyd v. North Broward Hospital District, the failure of
health care providers to detect genetic defects enabled the parents
to sue for mental anguish.345 The parents sought damages for
special care and maintenance expenses of their disabled child,
incurred both before and after the age of majority.34 This cause
of action belonged expressly to the parents and would not extend
to the child.347  Likewise, in Lininger v. Eisenbaum,4 it was
the parents who could bring a claim for the extraordinary medical
and educational expenses occasioned by a form of hereditary
blindness in the child, which the doctor negligently failed to
339. Id.
340. Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977).
341. 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982).
342. Id.
343. 471 N.E.2d 530 (Ill. 1984).
344. I& at 538.
345. 570 So.2d 984 (Fla. 1990).
346. I& at 986.
347. Im. at 988.
348. 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988).
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diagnose. The court stressed that the child could not have a claim
of its own under these circumstances.
349
The law in this area in both England and the United States
has offered contradictory answers to the controversial questions
under consideration. Unlike the action for wrongful life discussed
in the previous section, however, both countries are willing to
recognize claims for wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth.
Significan: differences remain over the extent of the damages
awarded, but it generally appears easier to seek damages in cases
where the child suffers disabilities, for the negligence itself, as well
as the more controversial damages, such as child-rearing expenses
and damages for emotional distress.
It is the task of this section of the Article to analyze why
courts are willing to recognize these actions and to discuss whether
such claims should, in fact, be permissible. It is also necessary to
consider whether any logical consistency exists to explain the
approach taken with regards to actions for wrongful life, wrongful
birth, and wrongful pregnancy.
C. The Desirability of Wrongful Pregnancy and Wrongful Birth
Actions
1. Cases Involving the Birth of Healthy Children
Similar to wrongful life, for an action to be successful in the law of
torts, it must be analyzed with the traditional elements of negli-
gence: a breach of a duty that led to an injury to the plaintiff,
which is compensable by monetary damages. The costs of a
healthy child should not be allowed under any of these elements.
a. The Duty
The concept of duty is a policy device used to determine whether
to extend or limit liability in certain instances. 50 It therefore is
impossible to separate the notion of duty from whether it is correct
on policy grounds to allow such an action. The "duty" that has
allegedly been breached in this type of case is the doctor's duty to
diagnose a pregnancy, to carry out a sterilization operation, or to
349. Md at 1206-07.
350. For a discussion of the duty concept, see supra Part 1.
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procure an abortion with due care and skill. As a result of her
breach of this duty, a healthy child has entered the world.
This Article does not dispute the fact that under the ordinary
principles of medical negligence, a plaintiff should be able to
recover for any injury suffered from the failed procedures
themselves. The precise calculation of these damages is discussed
below. The more controversial question, however, whether parents
can recover the costs of the child's life itself is not nearly as
obvious.
Compensating parents for the living costs of their healthy
baby, which they have chosen to keep, is a unique form of action
that needs careful consideration. Unlike the ordinary case of
medical negligence where the doctor must compensate the plaintiff
for the injury inflicted upon the person of that plaintiff, a wrongful
pregnancy action involves a plaintiff who asks not only to be
compensated for the negligent procedure, but also for the total
costs of the resulting life of the child. Naturally, the scale of the
damages is much larger than in the ordinary case. Furthermore,
sensitive issues of morality arise, especially when considering the
manner in which the parents have been injured, and the desirabili-
ty of encouraging courts to declare not only that a child is
unwanted; also, parents deserve to be compensated for the
"affliction" of having given birth to a healthy child. Therefore,
one has to ask whether it is desirable for the law to impose a duty
to the parent upon doctors to prevent the birth of a healthy child.
As supported below, the law should not recognize any such duty.
The usual way of measuring damages for the birth of a child
has been to balance the burdens of having a child against the
benefits that it provides. This test is neither practical nor desir-
able. The obvious question that must be addressed is whether it
is possible to measure either the "benefits" or the "burdens" of a
healthy child. As was pointed out in Terrell v. Garcia,31 it is
virtually impossible to place "a price tag on a child's smile" or
upon parental pride in that child's achievement. 2 It also is
possible that the benefits a child may provide later in life to his or
her ailing parents may outweigh the burdens that the parents
suffered at the outset of the life of the child, even from an
economic standpoint. A child often can provide various different
351. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1973).
352. Id. at 128.
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types of security for parents in their old age. Udale v. Bloomsburg
Area Health Authority3 3 provides an interesting demonstration
of the kind of results that are achieved if courts are forced to
measure the intangible. Justice Jupp applied the benefits and
burdens balance by declaring that "if I had to award damages to
Mrs. Udale under the disputed heads, I would have to regard the
financial disadvantages as offset by her gratitude for the gift of a
boy after four girls.
' 31
Arguably, the difficulty of assessing damages should not,
without more, rule out an action. There would have to be strong
social reasons to allow a claim, however. In this instance, such a
claim would do far more harm than good. It is highly undesirable
for a child to be publicly declared so unwanted that the trouble
that it gives to its parents outweighs the joys that healthy children
are supposed to cause. Critics all argue that this sentiment rests
on the notion that the birth of a baby is always a blessing.355
The argument that the use of contraception shows that the birth
of a child is not always a blessing is irrelevant to the issues
involved. The fact that birth control measures are publicly
accepted certainly is not evidence that public approval extends to
the granting of compensation to parents when contraception has
failed as a result of some form of medical negligence.356
Moreover, any test that requires parents to prove that their
child is more of a burden than a benefit before they can recover
damages necessarily requires that they devalue the worth of their
child before they could win such an action. It seems contrary to
the morals of any civilized society to require the law to recognize
an action that provides greater rewards to those who are best able
to demonstrate a severe loathing of their children. The more a
parent rejects parenthood, the more damages would be forthcom-
ing. To recognize that a child was initially unplanned is one thing;
to declare in a court of law that the child is unwanted and causes
despair to its parents once it is alive, sufficient to merit recovery
of substantial tort damages, is quite another. If a child were to
comprehend the action, he or she not only would suffer significant
353. [1983] 2 All E.R. 522.
354. Id. at 531.
355. See, inter alia, Diana Brahams, Damages for Unplanned Babies - A Trend to be
Discouraged?, 133 NEw L.J. 643, 645 (1983).
356. See C.R. Symmons, Policy Factors in Actions for Wrongful Birth, 50 MOD. L. REV.
269, 282 (1987).
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and foreseeable distress, but society also would have to ask
whether such an action did not, in reality, destroy any foundation
of family stability that the law has for centuries been encouraged
to promote.357
It is important to note that, unlike actions for wrongful life
where the child is the litigant, it is the parents who claim that the
birth of their child was "wrongful". A United States decision
acknowledged that allowing a wrongful pregnancy action "would
undermine society's need for a strong and healthy family relation-
ship. ' '11 Allowing an action for wrongful pregnancy would
potentially encourage parents to bring fraudulent claims in an
attempt to receive extra money for themselves. A wrongful
pregnancy complaint alleges that parents would have pursued a
different course of action had they been informed of their
pregnancy. The focus is on the firm testimony of parents testifying
about their intention to procure an abortion and that such an
intention was certain and unalterable. If recovery was allowed
based upon subjective testimony of parents about their state of
mind, the temptation to invent an intention to abort would be
significant indeed.
It is dangerous for legal actions to encourage mothers to feign
a lack of affection for their offspring. Legitimization of a wrongful
pregnancy action will do exactly that. Furthermore, courts fear
that parents will receive damages for the cost of raising their child,
only to later place the child for adoption. If parents choose to
proceed in this manner after the normal period of time for appeal,
there is no clear way to overcome this problem.
It can also be damaging to the child to find out that his life is
being funded entirely by a medical authority with whom he has
absolutely no connection. Equally important is the effect that an
action for wrongful life may have on the medical profession itself.
Allowing recovery for child rearing expenses places the medical
profession under an unreasonable burden. The action enables
357. See P.R. Glazebrook, Capable of Being, But No Right to be, Born Alive?, 50
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 241, 243 (1991), which states:
It is not deeply shocking that his own parents should, in the hope of obtaining
some financial help towards his care, have been driven in their desperation to
claim in the courts that he should (and would) have been killed before he was
born? ... Is not such a claim so offensive to all ordinary decent people that the
action should, without more ado, have been struck out on that ground?
358. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Ark. 1982).
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parents to keep their child, while shifting the child's entire cost
onto the physician. In effect, this establishes a new category of
substitute parents. Every benefit of a child-such as its smile, the
bond of love and affection within the family, the parental pride to
which it could give rise, the future contribution by the child to the
welfare and well-being of the family-would only be felt by the
parents. Every burden, such as the financial cost of the child's life,
his feeding, clothing, and education, would shift firmly onto the
medical profession. In the unique and financially arduous
circumstance of finding a remedy to compensate the parents for a
failed gynecological procedure, it is fairly apparent that the
punishment does not fit the crime.
The limits on a doctor's liability remain uncertain when
considering potential plaintiffs and the various injuries for which
the doctor could be liable. The decision in Custodio v. Bauer has
been followed by a number of subsequent cases in allowing siblings
of the new baby to claim a loss of a portion of the family's wealth
and parental attention.' Fortunately, this action was denied in
other cases."6  Once one allows parents to recover monetary
damages because they claim that child to be intolerable, the doors
are open to allow brothers, sisters, and possibly all other relatives
of the disadvantaged new child to also declare that the child is a
despicable creature who ought never to have been born and is
utterly unbearable now that he is alive.
No clear measure exists for calculating damages to be awarded
to parents, thereby leaving the medical profession faced with
increasing uncertainty about the precise extent of its liability. In
fact, in a trend that tends to ignore traditional tortious principles
and does not consider financial need, recent English cases
curiously have begun to award the largest damages to the
wealthiest families. In Benarr v. Kettering Health Authority,361
the fourth child born to a wealthy family was a result of a
negligently performed vasectomy. The three prior children were
conceived by choice. Mr. Benarr, the father, had a stable and
lucrative job. Despite his uncontested ability to pay for the
expenses himself, he sued to recover the expenses for his volun-
359. 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
360. Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Cox v. Stretton, 352
N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
361. 138 NEW L. J. 179 (1988).
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tarily decision to send his fourth child to a private school.362 In
addition to other child rearing costs, the court ordered the health
authority to pay Mr. Benarr an extra 19,500 ($35,000).363 More
recently, in Allen v. Bloomsbury Health Authority,36 the issue of
recovering for the cost of a private education was considered. The
court held that, as the law now stood, in cases where parents sent
all of their other children to expensive private boarding schools for
their entire education, "a very substantial claim for the cost of
private education of a healthy child of a reasonably wealthy family
might have to be met from the funds of the health authority
responsible for the doctor's negligence.1
365
These decisions emphatically illustrate the senselessness of
allowing claims for wrongful pregnancy. The culpability of the
defendant has to be weighed against the loss incurred by the
plaintiff. In wrongful pregnancy actions, balancing of interests
must be addressed. The medical profession is charged with
providing care and treatment to those in society who need it most.
The resources are severely limited, and it makes little sense to
compel the medical community to pay the largest awards to those
people who need it the least. Limited resources are much better
spent on the dire need for primary patient care. Conferring the
highest awards on people with the most money, from limited funds
that exist to provide essential and necessary treatment to the
poorest in society, reflects a paradox of such absurdity that no
sensible legal system should be prepared to accept it.
Public policy should preclude the imposition of duty on a
doctor to prevent the birth of a healthy child. Otherwise, liability
is imposed on a physician for the entire financial burden of a
child's life, while experiencing none of the joys that the child's
parents enjoy.
Undoubtedly, a medical professional owes a duty to a patient
to perform a medical procedure with due care and skill. If she
performs the procedure negligently, the medical professional is
liable under ordinary principles of medical malpractice. A
physician should not be held liable for the patient's child by paying
the total costs of the child's life. The law should not encourage
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. [1993] 1 All E.R. 651.
365. I& at 662.
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parents to declare in a court of law that their child is unwanted
and that the burdens override any benefit that the child may
provide to them. Medical professionals should not be required to
pay damages that impose an unreasonable burden upon them,
completely disproportionate to their culpability. This is particular-
ly true when these disproportionate awards could necessarily
deprive future patients of essential health treatment.
b. The Injury
To successfully recover, the plaintiff must suffer some form of
legally recognized harm. With respect to the negligently per-
formed procedures themselves, there is little doubt that the
plaintiff has suffered harm, physical or emotional, as with any
medical malpractice suit. The scope and precise amount of this
harm is discussed below.
To successfully recover child rearing and maintenance costs in
a wrongful pregnancy action, parents must prove that they suffered
a legal injury from gaining a healthy child. The established facts
of relevant cases, as well the parents' decision to raise the child,
tend to show that parents did not suffer an injury that ought to be
recognized by a court of law.
The Cockrum36 court stated: "in a proper hierarchy of
values, the benefit of life should not be outweighed by the expense
of supporting it. Respect for life and the rights proceeding from
it are at the heart of our legal system and, broader still, our
civilization. 3 67 Furthermore, the parents' reaction in some cases
are illuminating. In the English cases Thake26 and Udale,3 69
the parents were delighted with their children when they were
ultimately born. If the births were happy occasions, it is difficult
to comprehend how a birth can be regarded as a legally cognizable
harm. The American case, Ball v. Mudge,37 articulates the point
more strongly. The evidence showed that the parents deeply
cherished their child, which was born as a result of a negligently
performed sterilization.371 The parents were thrilled to have
366. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ill. 1983).
367. Id at 389.
368. [1984] 2 All E.R. 513.
369. [1983] 2 All E.R. 522.
370. 391 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964).
371. 1d. at 204.
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given birth to a healthy child.3" They refused to consider
placing the child for adoption, and "would not sell for
$50,000."' The court understandably concluded that, on these
facts, it could not be said that the parents suffered any legally
cognizable injury.
Unfortunately, cases exist where parents are not as delighted
with the birth of a healthy child. These parents may genuinely feel
that they have been harmed and the law must decide the manner
in which to deal with their "injury." Several cases have suggested
that parents do not suffer any harm in instances where they chose
to have an abortion. This argument is relevant to traditional tort
concepts that require a plaintiff to mitigate damages as far as
practicable. Further, the argument contends that parents cannot
suffer if they consciously decide to proceed with the birth of the
child. In Emeh v. Kensington Area Health Authority,374 Justice
Park declared that the mother's decision to refuse an abortion
under the circumstances was "so unreasonable as to eclipse the
defendant's wrongdoing." '375  This part of the decision was
correctly reversed by the court of appeal.376 Lord Justice Slade
stated that the defendants did not have a right to expect that a
mother would procure an abortion after a negligently performed
procedure.377  This ruling was particularly applicable where
negligence by the doctors was what "faced [the mother] with the
very dilemma which she had sought to avoid by having herself
sterilized." '378 Many U.S. cases3 79 and statutes380 agree that it
is never unreasonable for a mother to refuse to have an abortion.
It is abhorrent for defendants to be able to force a woman to
procure an abortion because of a pregnancy that resulted solely
from their own negligent acts. This course of action overlooks the
372. Id
373. Id
374. Emeh v. Kensington Area Health Auth., [1984] 3 All E.R. 1044, 1045.
375. Id. at 1052-53.
376. Id. at 1044.
377. Id. at 1053.
378. Id.
379. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
380. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6(b) (West 1994) ("The failure or refusal of a
parent to prevent the live birth of his or her child shall not be a defense in any action
against a third party, nor shall the failure or refusal be considered in awarding damages
in any such action.").
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established tort principle that a tortfeasor must "take his victim as
he finds her." Abortion is perhaps the most controversial issue in
today's society, fueled as it is with passions arising from religious,
moral, and ethical beliefs. The law could not subvert these
powerful influences by declaring that a mother not only can but
must have an abortion following the negligent acts of a medical
practitioner. As was reiterated in Troppi,81 if the mental and
emotional make-up of an individual mother prevents her from
procuring an abortion, the tortfeasor should not complain that the
damages are more than they would have been had the plaintiff
terminated her pregnancy.
The same cannot be said to be true with regard to adoption.
The primary issue under consideration, however, is whether any
legally cognizable injury to the parents has occurred. The measure
of damages, or the size of the injury, is the extent to which the
burden of -having a healthy child outweighs its benefits. This
Article is not advocating that parents should be required to place
their child for adoption once a negligent medical procedure has
resulted in its birth. The decision of the parents about whether or
not to keep their child, however, is probative of whether the
burdens caused by their child actually outweigh the benefits. If
one reduces a wrongful pregnancy claim to its bare essentials, one
sees that the parents are doing nothing more than appearing in
court and proclaiming that the birth of their child was worse than
not having it all. If this is true, then it does not seem unreason-
able to inquire of the parents about why they did not place their
child for adoption.
The adoption issue is really a reflection of the parents'
credibility in these actions. While the law certainly should not
obligate parents to find alternative homes for their children, it
should not immediately accept the parents' contention at face
value that having their child left them in a worse position. It is
reasonable to presume that parents, who adamantly argue that
looking after their child is so burdensome that they felt compelled
to bring a lawsuit, could have been spared considerable "distress,"
legal expenses, and anxiety if they placed their child in a more
loving home.
381. 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1971).
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Once again, the consequence of a successful wrongful
pregnancy action would place all the benefits of the child on the
parents while shifting the child's financial burden onto a third
party. If the child, once born, is a welcome member of the family,
it is difficult to posture that the plaintiffs have suffered any injury
in reference to the birth of the child.
While adoption has never been considered in British wrongful
pregnancy cases, the issue has been raised in U.S. courts. The
Troppi court found it unreasonable to require parents to place the
child for adoption. 3' The fundamental issue for the court to
consider was the best interests of the child. The court relied on
the law's preference to encourage the natural parents to raise the
child.3 3  A living child gives rise to emotional and spiritual
bonds that a parent would be reluctant to break.3' Further-
more, the court stated that, regardless of whether the parents
wanted to conceive and rear a child, they could feel a legal and
moral obligation to love the child and raise the child in the best
way they could rather than allowing it to be raised by unknown
persons.
Such assertions, however, clearly overlook the argument that
parents are not being forced to place their children for adoption.
The argument is only that if parents don't, the law should presume
that the benefits of the child outweigh its burdens. Therefore, the
plaintiffs suffered no legal injury for which they should receive
compensation. It is up to the parents to decide what action to
take. If the parents' bond to the child is sufficiently strong to
prevent them from pursuing adoption, the outcome to an apparent
unfortunate situation is a positive one. This also shows that the
benefits of the child overcome its burdens. The parents are free
to decide whether they wish to keep the child, or whether to place
it for adoption. If they do not choose the latter, they must
necessarily be prepared, not only to raise the child, but to do so at
their own expense.
Furthermore, adoption is very different from abortion in that
it does not raise the same intensity of religious or moral feeling.
Religious and political organizations that oppose abortion support
adoption as an alternative for a pregnant woman who does not
382. Id.
383. Id. at 520.
384. Id. at 519.
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want to raise her child.385 Many people are desperately seeking
to adopt, with an estimated two million families wanting to adopt
in the United States alone.386 In 1984, over eight thousand
children were adopted by American families from outside the
United States, and there are up to 100,000 inter-American
adoptions each year.387 Obviously, there is no shortage of willing
recipients for unwanted children.
Moreover, contrary to the holding in Troppi,388 adoption in
these cases may well be in the child's best interests. Placing an
infant for adoption at birth presents little danger to the newborn's
emotional ties. In fact, placing a child with adoptive parents who
truly want him is preferable to leaving the child with parents who
did not plan for or initially want him, and who may subsequently
resent that child's birth. It is further questionable whether a
child's best interests are served by allowing wrongful pregnancy
actions that will obligate someone else to pay for his upbringing
because his parents did not plan for him, nor wish to contribute to
his upbringing.
In short, there is little support for the proposition that, as a
matter of law, placing a child for adoption is not in the child's best
interests and, therefore, it is an unreasonable action for the parents
to take. Wrongful pregnancy actions should be denied on the
ground that the plaintiff parents have not suffered any legally
cognizable injury in the birth of their child. If the benefits of the
child are explicitly stated by the parents to be overwhelming, then
they clearly override the burdens. Accordingly, decision by the
parents to keep and nurture their child, rather than choosing to
place him for adoption, implies the same result.
385. See Norman M. Block, Wrongful Birth: The Avoidance of Consequences Doctrine
in Mitigation of Damages, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 1107, 1117 n.59 (1985) (citing religious
and political literature supporting adoption, including NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Jan.
12, 1984, at 4, which sets forth alternatives to abortion, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Oct.
28, 1982, at 5-8, which includes special adoption insert, and O'Connor, Human Lives,
Human Rights, CATHOLIC NEW YORK, Oct. 18, 1984, at $4-$5, which discusses adoption
services offered through the church).
386. Id. at 1117 (citing statistics listed in NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, INC.,
ADOPTION FACTS SUMMARY - 1984).
387. Id. at 1117.
388. 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1971).
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c. The Damages
The preceding section makes clear that no recovery should be
allowed for the costs of the child itself. The physician cannot be
exonerated, however, from his negligence in carrying out a
reproductive procedure. The plaintiff must be compensated for
the injury that follows from the negligence. There can be little
question about the issue of liability. The physician undoubtedly
owed the plaintiff a duty to carry out the required procedure with
due care and skill. This duty clearly was breached when the
procedure was performed negligently. In every case, the plaintiff
was injured because the pregnancy that followed was precisely
what the parents sought to avoid when undergoing the particular
procedure.
Moreover, the issues of foreseeability and proximate cause can
hardly be in doubt. If a physician is asked to carry out a vasecto-
my or an abortion, it seems difficult to argue that it was sought for
any reason other than to avoid pregnancy. Therefore, if a
pregnancy ensues as a result of negligence by the medical
practitioner, one could hardly pretend that it was an unforeseeable
event.
Damages should be awarded where a doctor negligently fails
to diagnose a pregnancy because a sterilization or other method of
contraception has failed, or because an abortion was negligently
performed, and the parents subsequently claim they would have
terminated that pregnancy had a proper diagnosis taken place.
There should be compensation for the physical pain and suffering
caused by the unanticipated pregnancy and delivery of the child,
including any pain that is experienced in the subsequent period of
recuperation. Furthermore, the medical expenses for the care and
treatment of the mother during the pregnancy and delivery should
be recovered, in addition to lost wages caused by the pregnancy,
delivery, or rehabilitation following the birth. Finally, damages for
the mother's emotional distress resulting from the actual or
anticipated physical pain and suffering associated with the
pregnancy and delivery should be compensable.
In cases where a doctor negligently has failed to detect a
pregnancy that the mother would have terminated had she been
given proper advice, an offset naturally would have to be made for
the benefits to the mother for not undergoing an abortion. There
are instances where the decision about whether to abort or
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whether to place the child for adoption can cause the parents great
mental trauma. There is no good reason why parents cannot also
make a claim for the emotional distress they suffer in having to
pursue these actions. Any mental anguish that is caused by the
decision to adopt or abort should be considered as part of the
damages.
2. Cases Involving the Birth of Unhealthy Children
All of the preceding considerations regarding healthy children
naturally should apply to those children made to experience life
with the added complication of a disability. Any other result
effectively would proclaim that the lives of handicapped children
are immediately considered less valuable by courts of law. In
these situations, it is neither easier nor more desirable to evaluate
the respective benefits and burdens of a child's life than in the
previous section, unless the law shamelessly declared that a
presumption existed that the burden of a handicapped child always
outweighed its benefits. To do so would be to overlook complete-
ly the vast contribution that handicapped children provide to their
families and to society as a whole. The same policy considerations
are applicable in cases involving the birth of children suffering
from disabilities including the possibility of fraudulent claims, the
unreasonable burden of the costs upon the medical profession, and
the ability of any set of parents to place their child for adoption.
In determining whether parents should be able to recover for
the "wrong" that they have "suffered," there should be no distinc-
tion between the birth of a healthy and an unhealthy child. The
basis for a claim following a negligently performed vasectomy or
abortion is the same whether the outcome is a healthy child or a
child who suffers particular disabilities. In order to establish tort
liability, the central issue is whether the negligent act should give
rise to a claim. Therefore, if duty, breach, injury, and damage
considerations rule out the possibility of a cause of action in
circumstances where a physician has negligently performed a
sterilization or an abortion, the fact that a child is born healthy as
opposed to unhealthy, is irrelevant. The claim arises, if at all, on
the basis of the negligent act, not on the basis of the result of that
act.
The majority of "wrongful birth" cases, however, do not arise
in situations where handicapped children are born as a result of a
negligently performed medical operation. It is far more common
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to base these claims on the doctor's failure to diagnose a medical
condition or to detect a genetic defect, which led the parents to
give birth to a child suffering from disabilities. Unlike the trend
established by English and American courts, there is an additional
and stronger reason to deny the parents a claim in these circum-
stances.
Critics of wrongful life actions by the child, on the basis that
it devalues the lives of disabled persons, rely on an excellent
rationale for denying a cause of action, but apply it to precisely the
wrong situation. It is not denigrating to allow disabled persons to
claim necessary financial support to help them enjoy their lives to
the greatest extent. There can be no greater insult to these
individuals than to allow other members of society to come to
court and walk away with compensatory damages for the "injury"
they sustained in giving birth to one who they view as less
"valuable" than themselves.
It was argued in the first part of this section that the courts in
England and the United States have been more inclined to award
damages in cases of children with defects, holding that the "harm"
to the parents in such cases is more definite and certain. Finding
injury to the parents whose child was born with defects is foreseen
to such a degree that many courts begin from the premise that
"the real question as to injury, therefore, is not the existence of
the injury, but the extent of that injury." '389 The concept of
parents attempting to prove that their child is so disabled that she
constitutes an injury to them is as intolerable as it is offensive. It
cannot represent anything other than a value-judgment on behalf
of society that the lives of the handicapped are worth considerably
less than those of a "normal" person. This is particularly true
when giving birth to a handicapped child in itself merits legal
compensation while the birth of a healthy child, in similar
circumstances, does not.
The labels of the actions alone reflect the value-judgment by
society in allowing greater compensation to parents of disabled
children than to those of healthy ones. If the result of a medical
procedure is the birth of a healthy baby, it is merely the "pregnan-
cy" that is "wrongful." If the child is less than perfect according
to society's standard, it is the "birth" itself that is "wrongful."
389. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 656 P.2d 483, 492 (Wash. 1983).
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Courts and commentators, alike, do not appear to question their
use of "wrongful pregnancy" and "wrongful birth" to distinguish
the actions, despite their explicit reflection of societal prejudices
which lie behind the claims.3 ° Ramey v. Fassoulas3 91 is one of
many cases that do not allow recovery for child-rearing expenses
because the parents gave birth to a healthy child. The court makes
an exception and allows recovery in situations where the child was
born with physical or mental defects. One must certainly agree
that these decisions are "contrary to fundamental common
sense.
, 392
If it is legal principle to deny recovery for child-rearing costs
in cases where the negligence of a doctor led to the birth of an
unwanted child, there is no logical ground for changing this
principle where the child is disabled. In each case the doctor has
caused only the birth, not the handicap. It does not make sense,
therefore, to hold the physician liable for child-rearing costs in the
latter situation while refusing to do so in the former. The doctor
could not have done anything to remedy the condition of the child
in a "wrongful birth" case. The extent of the defendant's negli-
gence is solely for causing the birth itself. The parents of a child
born with defects, therefore, are in no different position than
parents of a healthy child. The decision to treat similar cases
differently cannot be one based upon legal principle or reasoning.
Thus, it is necessary to analyze the darker forces that lie behind
the inconsistent results.
Every action that denies recovery to parents of a healthy
child, while granting it to those of a disabled child, in cases based
upon identical facts, "must imply that handicapped people are to
be valued less than are healthy ones, which is deeply insulting to
handicapped people, and to those who care for them. 3 93 Unlike
an action for wrongful life, which is made on behalf of the child
for its own needs because of its disabilities, in "wrongful birth"
cases, it is a third party, usually the parents, who sue for injury to
themselves caused by giving birth to a child with defects. To
emphasize the point, some courts have gone so far as to compen-
390. For an example of such a classification, see James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872
(W. Va. 1985). See also KIONKA, supra note 259.
391. 414 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
392. David D. Wilmoth, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action - Sugges-
tions for a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARO. L. REV. 611, 640 (1980).
393. Weir, supra, note 124, at 227.
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sate parents for the mental anguish that they suffered from the
delivery of the "abnormal" child.
Allowing a person who suffers from disabilities to bring her
own claim for necessaries to ease her condition is very different
from allowing others to assess her relative worth. Once other
people are allowed to claim that they were injured by the existence
of a handicapped person within their family, or even within
society, one is creating the very "Hitlerian elimination of the unfit"
that is wrongfully condemned by critics of the proposed action for
wrongful life. Once others are allowed to claim that they were
harmed by the existence of the handicapped, society is making
nothing more than a denigrating statement about the relative
worthlessness of such lives. It is dangerous to allow society to
bring a claim on its own behalf, rather than on behalf of the child,
thereby granting it the theoretical power of life or death over
those who it chooses not to consider to be "normal."
The majority of wrongful birth cases arise when a doctor has
failed to diagnose some form of genetic condition, consequently
resulting in the birth of an unhealthy child. The parents are not
necessarily stating that they did not want that child. In fact, a
child is exactly what they wanted. What they are saying, however,
is that they did not want a disabled child. Therefore, the basis for
the claim is not the child itself, but the fact that the child is
disabled. Parents who bring claims in such circumstances are
clearly making a value judgment that the live of a handicapped
child. At worst, those who bring an action for wrongful birth are
implying that a handicapped child's life is worthless to such an
extent that giving birth to the child constitutes a sufficiently
significant injury that it should be legally compensable. A claim
such as this is not only highly offensive to any legal system that is
supposed to exercise a modicum of morality, it extremely deni-
grates handicapped persons within society who are entitled to the
same fundamental rights and freedoms that belong to every
individual.
Any duty that a doctor owes to parents in informing them of
genetic deficiencies is one that must be owed to them on behalf of
the child. Anything short of this allows a third party to decide
whether the lives of handicapped persons are worth preserving.
No civilized society should make decisions about the relative worth
of the lives of its individual members. Actions like ones for
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wrongful birth that lead to the vilification of handicapped persons
should be denied on policy grounds alone.
III. CONCLUSION
Naturally, there is a vast difference in the legal system and the
legal culture that exists between the United States and England.
It is readily apparent, however, that the courses of action
available to people who consider themselves injured as a result of
the birth of an unanticipated child, caused by the negligence of
another, are virtually identical in both countries. With the notable
exception of a small minority of states, the legal solution in both
countries appears to be that a child cannot bring a claim in her
own right, whereas parents can recover, often for the child's entire
upbringing. Examining the approaches of two distinct, yet similar,
cultures to the same issue is not useful simply because one merely
discovers the answers that are provided. Far more revealing is an
analysis of the methods that are used to achieve their goal. The
comparative value of this study has been to highlight the errors
that are clearly apparent in the reasoning used, regardless of the
cultural background. The conclusions outlined in this Article are
equally applicable in both societies. The nature and importance
of the problem to be addressed can clearly transcend cultural
barriers. Each society needs to reassess the justice of the claim.
In doing so, each needs to formulate a new approach to a serious
problem which traditionally has not been subject to the critical
analysis which it deserves.
Actions for wrongful life, wrongful pregnancy, and wrongful
birth have been settled on a piecemeal basis, leading to inconsis-
tent and unjust results. This Article has attempted to return to
basics by examining all three actions together so as to delineate
the approach which the law should take regarding difficult legal,
ethical, and social problems. By simply highlighting the essential
features of each claim, the suggestions contained herein provide
solutions that better fulfill the needs of both legal principle and
public policy.
A child that is born suffering from a crippling and debilitating
disease or handicap, as the result of the negligence of another,
needs support. Because of the negligence of a third party, she was
born, is alive, and suffers. The negligence led to the present
excruciating pain suffered by the innocent infant. The function of
the law is not to immunize negligent physicians from liability no
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matter how culpable their negligent act or how significant the
suffering is that they have caused. The role of the law in these
circumstances is to provide the unfortunate victim with a cause of
action for wrongful life. This claim simply helps those children
who suffer from the severest and most distressing forms of
disability to bear the burden of their unnecessary affliction. It
provides them with essential relief from their condition. Far from
devaluing their existence, a claim for wrongful life recognizes the
inherent worth of the lives of those suffering from disabilities. The
cause of action states that a handicapped person has the same right
to receive the full measure of legal and non-legal rights and
privileges which are accorded to all members of society. An action
provides them with nothing less than justice, compassion and the
necessary support. It has been shown that the action clearly fits
into the tort elements of duty, breach, causation and injury to the
plaintiff. Frivolous claims would be difficult to develop because
the disabilities must be extremely severe in order to show that the
burdens of the condition outweigh the benefits of being alive.
When the requirements for the action have been met, however,
social justice demands that a child should receive the support of
the law. An award to the child's parents in these circumstances
does not take into account the child's own pain and suffering, the
factor that forms the basis of the action. Moreover, it provides no
guarantee of continued support for the child once she reaches
majority and all parental responsibilities cease.
Parents should not be allowed to recover for the rearing costs
of either a healthy or a handicapped child. A child should not be
declared so unwanted in a court of law that the dissatisfaction felt
by his parents far outweighs the joys that he provides. Parents
should not be allowed to recover greater damages by expanding
the degree to which they can prove the intolerable burden caused
to them by their child. Parents have not suffered legal injury if
they freely decide to keep and nurture the child themselves. The
situation is not different when dealing with children who suffer
from disabilities, unless the law is clearly willing to declare that the
lives of the handicapped are worthless, a declaration that should
make any civilized society writhe with shame.
The medical profession should be liable for the extent to
which its negligent acts have led to injuries, but no further. This
Article attempts to strike a fair balance between the needs of
those members of society who are injured by medical malpractice
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and the public interest in having a workable system of health care
that is able to provide for the primary treatment of its patients.
To compensate victims or the harm which they have suffered is as
essential as ensuring that no unreasonably excessive burden is
place upon the medical profession, disproportionate to its culpabili-
ty.
Therefore, where a doctor has negligently failed to diagnose
a genetic defect or the effects of a disease and this negligence
leads to the birth of a child who suffers from disabilities, the child
should be able to bring her own claim for wrongful life if her
disabilities are so severe as to outweigh the benefits of being alive.
She should be entitled to compensation for her pain and suffering,
as well as any extraordinary medical expenses which are necessitat-
ed because of her condition. Her parents, however, should have
no legal action, as it would be highly denigrating to their child and
to the handicapped population in general.
In situations where a child is born as a result of a failed
medical procedure, such as a negligently performed sterilization or
abortion, the child should only have a claim where the burden of
being alive outweighs the benefit. If a child is either healthy or
suffers from only a minor defect, he should not be able to
successfully bring a cause of action. Should the disability be acute,
however, he should be entitled to bring a wrongful life action.
Parents are entitled to a limited form of recovery in wrongful
pregnancy and wrongful birth situations. They are entitled to
bring an action for the injury they suffered as a direct result of the
negligently performed procedure, such as damages for their pain
and suffering and financial losses associated with the pregnancy,
delivery and immediate effects of the childbirth itself. They should
be denied any compensation, however, for the costs of the
maintenance of their child. The benefits of having given birth to
a child outweigh the burdens of any responsibilities that naturally
follow as a result. This is true whether the child is healthy or
handicapped, supported by the same principle, discussed above,
that society must not differentiate and thereby necessarily devalue
the lives of the handicapped.
The actions discussed balance the needs of the plaintiff against
the wrongdoing of the defendant. In actions for wrongful life the
physician is held liable, but only to the extent of the harm he
caused. By requiring a disabled child to show that her disabilities
outweigh the burdens of being alive, the physician is being held
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liable for the child's wrongful life that he negligently caused. In
cases where children claim they suffer in some way, however, but
not to such a degree that their injuries outweigh the benefits of
their lives, should be rejected. The negligent act of the doctor did
not cause the injury itself, which would have arisen in any event
through a genetic defect or a crippling disease. The action ensures
that a doctor is held liable for the harm only to the extent it was
caused by his negligence. A doctor should be liable for a wrongful
life, but not for an injury that would have arisen without any
negligence on his part.
In actions for wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth, the
doctor is held liable for the extent of the injuries that his negli-
gence actually caused to the parents, and nothing further. For this
reason, parents can bring an action to recover for the costs of the
failed procedure itself but not for child-rearing costs. They should
not be able to enjoy all the benefits that their child brings to them,
while placing all financial burdens on the medical profession. If a
child is born suffering from a severe disability, the parents should
not be given an action for their own disappointment about having
given birth to a child who does not meet their opinion of a
"perfect" child. Denying this action to the parents, however, does
not leave the child without legal redress. The child can bring a
claim for her own pain and suffering and extraordinary costs on
the basis of a wrongful life action previously discussed.
These solutions ensure equity and compassion for all parties
in each situation. It is not unreasonable for society to expect that
its legal system will provide fairness, consistency, and true justice.
Through its suggestions, this Article hopes to have taken a small
step to promote that noble goal.
1995] 613

